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Glossary
Buy-side Consumers of analysts’ reports (including narrative and forecast data) such as fund managers.
Corporate governance 
reporting
Annual report disclosure containing information relating to corporate governance and reported 
compliance with corporate governance codes. Sometimes of interest because it contains details of 
directors’ rewards.
Equities Issued share capital of public companies traded on the equities markets (London Stock Exchange, etc.)
Equity research Production of forecast information by sell-side analysts primarily cashflow and profit based measures, 
and management strategy to support buy/sell/hold recommendations and reports on equities.
Forecasting Future profit and loss, cashflow and balance sheet predictions based on current available accounting 
information and management comment.
Front end Annual report sections devoted to voluntary disclosure narrative prior to statutory reporting sections 
typically starting with the directors’ report.
Fund managers Individuals within investment companies, assurance and pension funds responsible for equity, debt, cash 
and other financial instrument allocation and selection within funds under their management (managed 
funds).
Information ‘supply chain’ The process of production of accounting information (by preparer companies), its interpretation (by 
sell-side analysts) and its consumption (by buy-side). The consumption and use of accounting and other 
annual report information from companies used by sell-side analysts for their equity reports and 
recommendations to buy-side funds.
Mandatory/statutory 
disclosure
Reporting compliant with relevant reporting standards and regulatory/legislative instruments.
Preparers Public companies that publish reporting data compliant with relevant IFRS and legislative frameworks. 
Annual reports also include voluntary narrative disclosure.
Risk reporting Voluntary reporting relating to risks that companies are exposed such as financial and operating risks 
and their management of those risks.
Sell-side Producers of equities research and forecasting data for consumption by fund managers and other buy 
side participants.
Social and environmental 
reporting
Voluntary disclosure containing information on the company’s impacts upon a range of social and 
environmental constituencies or stakeholders. Typical contents include information on human resources, 
communities, environmental resource consumption and environmental impact.
Strategy reporting Information containing detail on the company’s strategy. Typically forward looking in tone, it is more 
likely to be present in the chairman’s statement or the chief executive’s statement in an annual report.
Voluntary disclosure/
narrative
Information provided by companies within annual reports not covered by statutory reporting 
requirements including social, environmental and risk disclo sures
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Aims ANd objectiVes of the ReseARch
The primary aim of this research is to explore questions of 
usefulness and materiality of annual report narrative 
disclosures. The research addresses calls made by, among 
others, Smith (2004: 202), who suggests that, ‘future 
research will more widely examine the discretionary 
disclosures made by firms to explore their impact on 
decision makers and on investment analysts’ stock 
recommendations’. In order to do this, a method was 
chosen that would facilitate an in-depth and narrative-rich 
discussion of the issues in question with perhaps the 
single most important and influential user group of audited 
and narrative company reporting: sell-side analysts.
The sell-side’s role as the primary interpreter of company 
information for buy-side and fund management purposes 
makes it a suitable source of opinion on the research 
question, as it is the sell-side’s consumption of corporate 
reporting upon which fund allocation decisions are 
ultimately made. Given that, in volume terms, most 
institutional ‘real money’ changes hands on the basis of 
sell-side advice, sell-side analysts are uniquely placed to 
comment on the investment materiality of a range of 
voluntary narratives and it was upon that basis that they 
were selected for this study.
Nineteen London-based sell-side analysts were interviewed 
between late 2004 and mid 2006, each of whom analysed 
only the banking sector. The focus on the banking sector 
was for several reasons, prominent among which was the 
fact that banking (along with technology, pharmaceutical 
and oil/gas) is one of the four main ‘volume’ trading sectors 
in London, strategically important to the UK economy and 
comprising approximately 15% of the total FTSE 100 market 
value. It was further believed that focusing on one sector 
rather than performing a shallower cross-sectional study 
would enable a greater penetration to be made of issues 
relevant to materiality in that single sector. All analysts 
were interviewed using a semi-formal method, and 
interview transcriptions were content analysed and sorted 
by the category of voluntary disclosure being discussed.
iNtRoductioN to the toPic
This research report is about the voluntary narrative 
sections of company annual reports, with particular 
reference to the annual reports of UK banks. Voluntary 
narratives are defined as those parts of the annual report 
not mandated by Companies Act requirements and not 
reported on as part of the audit report. Such disclosure 
narratives include, among other things, the chairman’s 
statement, chief executive’s review, social and 
environmental reports, and risk disclosures. There is an 
academic literature that has examined the patterns of 
voluntary disclosure and these contributions have fallen 
roughly into three general categories: empirical studies 
examining trends and changes in reporting; theory 
building and testing contributions; and user-needs 
analyses. It is to this latter strand of literature that this 
study aims to make a contribution.
There has been a marked growth in many types of 
voluntary and narrative reporting in recent years, with 
media other than the hard copy annual reports in the 
ascendant as carriers of reporting messages. Despite this 
growth, large companies continue to produce elaborate, 
lengthy and detailed annual reports with narrative sections 
extending to, in some cases, hundreds of pages. The 
annual reports for 2006 of HSBC Holdings plc and 
Barclays plc were 458 pages and 310 pages respectively. 
One of the questions frequently raised, but not well 
answered, in considering this growth is the actual 
usefulness of this surfeit of narrative in annual reports. 
Who reads it, is the information useful and is it material to 
fund allocation decisions made by investors? And if not, 
what are the implications for preparers of annual reports?
‘Analysts like numbers, to be honest’
ANALyST A9
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summARy of fiNdiNgs
Each analyst expressed views on a range of voluntary and 
narrative disclosure categories, including management 
commentaries such as the chairman’s statement, chief 
executive’s review, operating and financial review, risk 
reporting and the corporate governance statement. In 
addition, other areas of voluntary narrative were discussed 
at some length including social, environmental and ethical 
reporting (partly because these issues have preoccupied 
many academic researchers in the field).
There was a general belief that narrative reporting was not 
immediately applicable nor helpful in the primary tasks of 
the sell-side which is to construct forecast models and 
produce written reports for the buy-side. The normal view 
was that narrative reporting was less useful to analysts 
than to other putative users of annual reports but most 
analysts were unable to identify specific consumers of any 
given disclosure category.
The chairman’s statement was generally considered to be 
less useful than the chief executive’s review because the 
latter was more likely (in most annual reports) to contain 
meaningful information on future strategy. The content of 
the chairman’s statement was generally dismissed as 
irrelevant to the investment decision or to any forecasting 
figure. Risk disclosure was generally thought of as too 
general in nature to be useful. Corporate governance 
reporting (mandatory under listing rules under UK ‘comply 
or explain’ practice) was usually unread because 
governance in UK banking was generally trusted by the 
analysts. Social and environmental reporting was 
universally considered irrelevant and incapable of 
influencing a financial forecast. It was rarely read by 
analysts and any suggestion that the environmental 
reporting might contain disclosures germane to the 
description of secondary (ie loan book) environmental risk 
was dismissed.
imPlicAtioNs of fiNdiNgs
Analysts were shown by this research to be technocratic 
and rules-driven in nature, and unlikely to be a source of 
change in respect of social and environmental issues. They 
were generally sceptical about all voluntary narrative 
reporting and were dismissive of large sections of it as 
irrelevant, ‘useless’ or worse.
There are a number of issues raised by the findings. 
Prominently, these findings represent a challenge to 
preparers of annual reports, who have presided over a 
period of volumetric expansion of narrative content, the 
value of much of which to analysts can now be questioned. 
If it is the intention of preparers to make narrative 
reporting relevant and material to investors, they appear to 
have some way to go or some rethinking to do.
Similarly, however, the findings highlight the way in which 
analysts are dismissive of anything other than directly 
value-relevant numerical data. The belief that no narrative 
reporting is capable of informing, amending or challenging 
a financial forecast is a curious one. 
6There is a growing tradition of research in voluntary 
disclosure of accounting information. Several themes or 
genres of research can be identified in the literature with 
those prominent including descriptive studies, theory 
testing and user-needs analysis and perspectives. 
Descriptive studies are those that have noted changes and 
trends in various aspects of reporting behaviour; theory-
testing studies are those that have attempted to use 
reporting evidence to inform a variety of theoretical 
perspectives; while user-perspective studies have sought 
to identify user needs and measure reporting against 
those needs. This study seeks to make a contribution to 
the last of these three genres.
1.1 the iNfoRmAtioN ‘suPPly chAiN’
The passage of information from reporters to consumers 
of corporate information is a complex one but an 
approximate ‘supply chain’ can be identified, at least as far 
as institutional stock market participants are concerned. 
The situation is slightly different for some individual and 
smaller investors. 
The reporting company makes disclosure through a 
number of media. These will typically include analysts’ 
briefings at the time of the publication of the results, 
interim accounts, final annual report and accounts (usually 
several weeks after the initial analysts’ briefings), ‘stand 
alone’ reports and press statements made to the press or 
through the investor relations department. Most of the 
financial information used by analysts is made available at 
the results publication date, some weeks ahead (usually) of 
the publication of the annual report, and the annual report 
is mainly used, where it is used at all, for its narrative 
content and small items of financial information not in the 
preliminary results (such as board members’ salaries).
On the basis of their reading of a company’s financials and 
other strategic information, sell-side analysts provide 
advice to buy-side clients. The formal channel for this is 
the analysts’ report, produced to an approximate pro 
forma (although this may be disputed by some analysts) 
and it is common, although obviously not compulsory, for 
this to be shown to the subject company’s investor 
relations department being analysed, prior to publication. 
The investor relations department may then suggest 
amendments before the report is published.
Publication is commonly through subscription-based 
online sources that are available to the buy-side although 
informal contact also takes place where more robust views 
on individual stocks might be exchanged. The analyst’s 
report, as a document in the public domain, tends to be 
carefully worded. But in the event that ‘coded’ statements 
are not understood by favoured buy-side clients, the 
informal contact conveys enriching information over and 
above the formal report.
Sell-side analysts are a key part of the information ‘supply 
chain’, and the basis for the primary research undertaken 
for this report. Their importance in the ‘supply chain’ has 
been recognised in the academic literature. Johansson 
(2007: 30), for example, comments that: ‘sell-side analysts 
are … key actors in this market and the analysts’ relations 
with company representatives and clients seem to be a 
central part of the value-creation chain in the market’. 
Jackson (2005) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) also both 
recognise the primary role of the sell-side analyst acting as 
an information intermediary in the investment process. Lui 
et al. (2007: 630) say that: ‘given that [sell-side] analysts 
have been shown to influence investor behaviour and given 
the importance of risk in making investment decisions, an 
empirical investigation of analysts’ risk assessments 
seems long overdue. In general, analysts add value by both 
aggregating publicly available information and generating 
new information.’ In the professional and practice media, 
Investor Relations Society (2003) commented that: ‘sell-
side analysts remain an important audience for corporate 
communications. Sell-side analysts still play an important 
role in the market’.
The buy-side makes use of a number of sources of 
information but tends to rely quite heavily on sell-side 
analysts’ reports. Most investment houses impose 
restrictions on share dealing behaviour by fund managers 
that goes against the explicit advice of the sell-side. 
Because fund managers typically deal in many stocks at a 
time, they use direct company information only 
intermittently. Although a fund manager may read an 
annual report for a particularly important stock, this is not 
1. introduction
‘you’re never satisfied with what you’re given. you always want more. 
that’s it, end of story. you always want more. you always want the 
better description, you want more granularity, you want more 
information as an analyst to get a better understanding of what’s going 
on in the business.’
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a systematic activity and so the sector- and company-
specific information provided by the sell-side is seen as 
very important.
The polling organisation MORI conducted a survey for the 
Financial Services Authority in 2005 that involved 300 
interviews with respondents at buy-side organisations. The 
initial question posed was: ‘How important would you say 
investment research produced by sell-side institutions is 
as a source of information and ideas about the companies, 
sectors or assets you follow or invest in?’ (FSA 2005: 20). 
The responses demonstrated the importance of the 
sell-side to the buy-side, with 29% viewing sell-side 
research as ‘very important’ and 52% as ‘important’. Only 
14% of respondents viewed sell-side advice as 
‘unimportant’. 
Similarly, Ethical Corporation reports, ‘the role of sell-side 
analysts is seen as crucial, as their views are given weight 
not only by asset managers, but also by high-level 
managers in companies themselves’ (Schiller 2005). This 
practice-based research is consistent with the findings of 
Womack (1996) and, more recently, Johansson (2007) 
who examine the role of sell-side analysts in the 
information supply chain. Johansson (2007: 31) says that: 
‘in a short time perspective, the analysts’ 
recommendations seem to influence the price of a stock, 
and, according to studies on the market level, their written 
recommendations tend to convey valuable and new 
information.’
The buy-side will typically receive several analysts’ reports, 
through the online subscription provider, on any given 
sector or stock. Over time, favoured analysts will be 
followed and less favoured ones will not. In each case, 
however, the buy-side will typically look for ‘snippets’ of 
research ‘over and above’ the template or pro forma. 
Advice based on experience beyond the financial 
information is valued, although because of the politics of 
the relationship between analyst and company this is often 
difficult to provide. This brings us, however, to the next 
section.
1.2 the RelAtioNshiP betweeN comPANies ANd 
ANAlysts
In the information ‘supply chain’ then, the sell-side analyst 
is the primary interpreter of company reporting. Given that 
fund managers, who are the actuators of fund allocations, 
do not systematically study company information directly, 
there is a heavy reliance on analysts’ interpretations of 
company situations and financial performance forecasts.
There is a tension in an analyst’s role between 
independence from a company being analysed and his or 
her dependence on the company in terms of information 
provision and general relations. There are a number of 
reasons why analysts send their reports to the analysed 
company prior to publication. The most prominent reasons 
are relationship management and checking for accuracy. 
The investor relations departments may make suggestions 
but if the analyst feels the need to say something negative 
in the report he or she must balance the strength of the 
wording with the need to manage the relationship with the 
company over the longer term. It is thought that senior 
company officers have their ‘favourite’ and ‘most trusted’ 
analysts that, it is believed, are the most likely to receive 
communications and information confirmations at key 
times. Inasmuch as such information can be a source of 
competitive advantage for an analyst, the management of 
that relationship, over many years, is very important.
It is conceivable, therefore, that some information germane 
to investment decisions is expressed in less than direct 
terms and in terms capable of being overlooked or missed 
altogether. Such ‘soft-pedalling’ in the interests of 
relationship management may be a source of concern to 
some observers in respect of the independence of 
analysts.
One of the analysts in the study (Analyst A2), speaking 
anonymously, was robust in his/her description of the 
company–analyst relationship, describing it as 
‘adversarial’.
Analysts and companies are adversarial. The role of the 
analyst is to act on behalf of the investor and the analyst 
must expect that the company is potentially going to 
mislead them and therefore you have to take whatever 
they say with a significant amount of salt and you have to 
be looking for signs where perhaps numbers that they are 
forced to report… do not match up to management 
statements or other numbers that they’ve published.
It seems to be the case, then, that a balance exists 
between analysts’ need to cultivate long-term relationships 
with the companies they cover and the need to maintain a 
healthy detachment and scepticism. The possibility that 
companies may seek to ‘mislead’ investors places analysts 
in a very important position in the information supply 
chain, as it is they who must interpret and discover such 
behaviour on behalf of those further down the supply 
chain that depend on their advice. Such a situation is 
explicitly recognised by Ljungqvist et al. (2007: 421) who 
state that: 
companies care about what the analyst has to say about 
their stocks and could take their investment banking 
business elsewhere if they are unhappy with the analyst’s 
opinion. Thus sell-side analysts who work for integrated 
investment banking houses could come under implicit (or 
occasionally explicit) pressure to publish more favorable 
[sic] research about their employers’ current or potential 
relationship clients to help boost investment banking fee 
revenue.
This problem of the objectivity trade-off with relationship 
management and trade generation is discussed at length 
by Jackson (2005), Lin and McNichols (1998), Ljungqvist 
et al. (2007), and Michaely and Womack (1999). 
The reciprocity between company and analyst was 
discussed by several interviewees in the cohort used in 
this study. Analyst A16 was asked whether he or she 
8believed that company finance directors were concerned 
about what analysts said about them.
I think they do care because I think a lack of disclosure at 
some level effectively puts up their cost of capital. I think 
it’s a genuine driver and they know it. Companies with 
the most open, best disclosure, everything else being 
equal, tend to see a higher rating and that’s, I think, 
something you can start to show.
1.3 the chANgiNg Role ANd coNteNt of the 
ANNuAl RePoRt
Much of the prior research in voluntary disclosure has 
taken place in the context of the corporate annual report. 
Although voluntary disclosure on a range of issues takes 
place through media, including advertising, public relations 
documents, websites, special reports, press statements 
and through informal channels, research has centred on 
the annual report for several reasons. These have included 
the notion that as the only statutory annual 
communication with shareholders, anything considered 
important enough to be said would be conveyed in that 
document. Given that the company has almost total 
editorial control over the narrative content of the annual 
report, it is assumed to be the representative medium of a 
company’s overall reporting intent. Botosan (1997: 331) 
notes that, ‘the annual report is generally considered to be 
one of the most important sources of corporate 
information’ while Gray S. J. et al. (1995: 45) goes slightly 
further, suggesting that, ‘the annual report is a significant 
element in the overall disclosure process, given that it is 
the most widely disseminated source of [company] 
information’.
Annual reports have grown in length over the past recent 
decades. Campbell et al. (2006) reports that the average 
length of an annual report rose from 37 pages in 1974 to 
90 pages in 2000. As they have grown in length, content 
has been added in response to a number of supposed 
information demands from users. The general expansion 
of explanatory notes to the accounts and the requirements 
under different corporate governance code provisions for 
more information have been accompanied by some 
additional requirements under recent companies acts and 
listing rules. In addition to legal, regulatory and statutory 
content, however, annual reports have been noteworthy in 
recent years for the increased amount of narrative 
reporting, ‘the importance of [which]… by listed 
companies is expected to increase in the future’ (Beattie et 
al. 2004: 232). Increased narrative reporting is thought to 
be related to the increased public scrutiny of business 
activities and the assumed need to explain various aspects 
of activity not amenable to numerical conveyance. Beattie 
and Pratt (2002: 1) note that, ‘the importance of narrative 
reporting in annual reports has significantly increased’ 
while Clatworthy and Jones (2001: 311), similarly, find that, 
‘accounting narratives are becoming increasingly 
important in external financial reporting.’
Gray S. J. et al. (1995) highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between types of information in examining 
voluntary disclosures. The voluntary narrative reporting 
categories that have attracted the attention of academic 
researchers include:
risk reporting (eg Cabedo and Tirado 2004; Linsley and •	
Shrives 2005; Linsley and Shrives 2006; Schrand and 
Elliot 1998; Woods 2004) 
the content of the chairman’s statement (eg Arnold and •	
Moizer 1984; Day 1986; Rippington and Taffler 1995; 
Smith and Taffler 2000) 
a range of other content that can generally be regarded •	
as social, environmental and/or ethical in nature (eg 
Beattie and Pratt 2002; Deegan and Gordon 1996; 
Deegan and Rankin 1999; Gray, R. H. et al. 1995; Miles 
et al. 2002; Milne and Chan 1999; Solomon and 
Solomon 2006).
Previous academic studies have taken the opportunity to 
examine some of the trends and changes in these 
narrative reporting categories (see for instance Gray R. H. 
et al. 1995; Lehman 2004) and some have attempted to 
theorise links between changing reporting practices and 
changes in society in general (see for instance Patten 
1995, Deegan and Gordon 1996, Wilmshurst and Frost 
2000; and O’Donovan 2002). While several such studies 
have been published, few of them have addressed the 
issues of the materiality or usefulness of the increased 
narrative disclosures. It is to this genre of literature that 
this research report is intended to contribute.
Although academic studies have examined patterns in 
these disclosures, relatively few have examined the manner 
in which they are used by capital market participants. The 
prominent studies relevant to this research are detailed in 
the following literature review. Although a number of 
studies have sought, with varying degrees of success, to 
interrogate the views of a range of capital market 
participants, this report is one of the first to gain 
systematic evidence directly from the sell-side.
The importance of this study is also underlined by the 
growth in other media for corporate reporting purposes. 
Whereas at one time the annual report would be the only 
public document produced by companies (except for those 
that produced advertisements and other marketing 
literature), the changing landscape of corporate 
communications has reinforced the importance of 
questions on why the annual report is a suitable vehicle for 
some narrative disclosures. In addition to stand-alone 
social and environmental reports (which have emerged 
over the past decade or so), it is likely that the company 
website has become the vehicle of choice for most 
stakeholders seeking information on a company.
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2.1 ANAlysts iN PReVious ReseARch
The position of sell-side analysts in the information ‘supply 
chain’ between reporting companies and investors has 
made them a suitable subject for a number of previous 
studies. As a cohort, analysts have been thought to be 
capable of speaking on the materiality of information, 
owing to their assumed role as interpreters of accounting 
‘numbers’ and strategic intent.
As they are sophisticated users of corporate disclosures of 
varying types, Day (1986: 295) refers to analysts as, 
‘perhaps the most informed and articulate user group.’ 
Their role in the flow of intelligence in capital markets is 
referred to by Fogarty and Rogers (2005: 331) who 
comment that: ‘financial analysts employed by securities 
firms play an important role in the capital markets. Most 
importantly, the reports that they produce are given great 
consequence by many market participants’. Similarly, 
Vergoossen (1993: 219) remarks, ‘since many investment 
decisions are based on their findings...investment analysts 
play an important role in the capital markets’.
This study is specifically concerned with how analysts 
regard voluntary disclosure narrative in the annual report. 
The debate between information sources and materiality 
has been evident in the literature for some time. In early 
studies, Lee and Tweedie (1975) and Firth (1978) both 
note that the annual report is an important information 
source for investment decisions, but both these studies 
were published prior to the development of other 
information sources used by analysts today, such as online 
sources and stand-alone reports. In the 1980s, Arnold and 
Moizer (1984) examined methods used by UK analysts to 
appraise equities. They find that the most used parts of 
the annual report are used for such purposes, with the 
profit and loss, and the balance sheet being the most used 
statements. This is consistent with the findings of Lee and 
Tweedie (1981) although again, being studies of their time, 
voluntary disclosures are not addressed (see also 
Bouwman et al. 1987).
Research into analysts’ use of different information 
sources is reflected in the literature. In addition to 
examining which parts of the annual report are used by 
analysts, some studies ask about the relative importance 
placed upon the annual report compared with other 
information sources. In practice, ‘other’ information 
sources usually refers to direct contact with the reporting 
companies themselves. Inasmuch as direct ‘personal’ 
meetings for the disclosure of new information are 
unauthorised, ‘direct contact’ in this context tends to refer 
to analysts’ briefings, contact with the investor relations 
department or direct contact with senior officers for the 
purpose of clarification and explanation only. A more 
detailed discussion of the extant literature addressing 
analyst use of annual reports now follows. 
Several studies find that direct contact is generally 
considered more important to analysts (in terms of 
company analysis) than the information contained in the 
annual report. Pike et al.’s (1993) is typical of the studies 
that find that personal contacts between analysts and 
corporate personnel are more important than the annual 
report. In most cases, however, analysts said that they 
placed the annual report second only to (ie immediately 
behind) direct contact in terms of the usefulness and 
materiality of its content (Chang and Most 1985). Barker 
(1998), similarly, finds that analysts attach less importance 
to the annual report compared with personal contact, 
results announcements and analyst presentations (by 
companies at the financial year end). The reason for this is 
that, ‘the annual report doesn’t satisfy analysts’ short term 
news orientation’ (Barker 1998: 12; see also Hellman 
1996). A small number of other studies find responses at 
some variance to this ‘order’. Brown (1997) finds the 
annual report to be the most important information source 
while Vergoossen (1993) finds that the majority of analysts 
rate, ‘the most recent annual report as their most 
important source of information’ (Vergoossen 1993: 229). 
Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) find, conversely, that the 
annual report is in third place behind direct contact and 
press reports in its importance as an information source.
Previous analyst studies that inquired about the section of 
annual reports of most use to analysts overwhelmingly 
find that the financials were the most used. Brown (1997) 
finds the income statement (profit and loss statement) to 
be the most useful annual report component. Chang and 
Most (1985) find the same in terms of the importance of 
the income statement and also find that the balance sheet 
and notes to the accounts are the next most important 
components. They go on to report that front end parts 
(such as narrative sections) are considered the least 
important, with the supervisory board report (directors’ 
report in the UK) being noted as particularly insignificant. 
Previtts et al. (1994) note that sell-side analysts find the 
income statement and cash flow statements to be of most 
use, followed by segmental information by geographic 
area/business unit. They find that the usefulness of 
non-financial (narrative) information centres on quality of 
management, new developments and other changes. Other 
studies examining analyst behaviour in respect of 
voluntary reporting include Anderson and Potter (1998); 
Biggs (1984); Birts et al. (1997); Bouwman (1984); 
Bouwman et al. (1987); Flostrand and Strom (2006); Gray 
and Skogsvik (2004); Rogers and Grant (1997); Snyder 
(1999).
Flostrand and Strom (2006) compare 200 analyst reports 
to 200 matched annual reports to examine the relevance 
of non-financial disclosure and the use made of such 
disclosure by analysts in their company valuation process. 
Their approach highlighted valuation relevance, which is 
the information usefulness of disclosures to analysts 
(much the same as the research objectives of this current 
study). Valuation relevance allows for a discussion of 
factors that may not necessarily have a direct relationship 
with share price but nonetheless may be useful to analysts 
in their overall valuation process. On the other hand, value 
relevance rests on statistical relationships between 
information and market value. Murray et al. (2006) find 
that there is no direct relationship between share returns 
and disclosure, although longitudinal data do show a 
2. literature review
10
relationship between consistently high (low) returns and 
the predilection to high (low) disclosure.
Earlier studies on the value relevance of voluntary 
disclosure find mixed evidence for the value relevance of 
voluntary, non-financial information. Gray, S. J. et al. (1995) 
find that non-financial information is directed more 
towards a company’s social accountability, which can, in 
turn, have a bottom line significance and affect share 
value. Richardson et al. (1999: 21) develop a model of CSR 
to capital market responses, asserting that, ‘the release of 
information about any value relevant aspect of the firm, 
including CSR, has a direct impact on the way in which 
markets for equity operate’. Rippington and Taffler (1995) 
examine the usefulness of the annual report and its impact 
on share price. They find that while there is little impact on 
share price of the annual report release per se, impact is 
highlighted from new information coming from the annual 
report, such as the chairman’s report. For further 
discussion of value relevance see also Orlitsky and 
Benjamin (2001), Lorraine et al. (2004), and Toms (2002).
Reflecting on analysts’ use of disclosures, Holland (1998) 
finds that private disclosure to financial intermediaries is a 
significant part of the information process (see also 
Solomon and Solomon 2006). On the limitations of annual 
reports, Holland says that, ‘the financial report has 
become too complex, too large and too cumbersome for 
many users and a source of overload’ (Holland 1998: 262). 
Despite this, the annual report is recognised as a central 
component in the disclosure system as a ‘first layer of 
understanding’ (Holland 1998: 264).
2.2 ANNuAl RePoRts’ coNteNt ANd ReAdeRshiP
There is a substantial literature on voluntary reporting in 
annual reports and a small but still significant body of 
research exists on the actual role of the annual report. In a 
research report such as this, it is stressed that it is not 
possible to present a full and exhaustive discussion of this 
literature but rather to introduce some of the key 
questions and findings from previous work by way of 
introduction to the main presentation of evidence from the 
analysts interviewed for this research.
An early call for research in this area is made by Day 
(1986: 295) when she concluded that, ‘little [up to 1986] 
has been written about what users themselves appear to 
find useful [in an annual report]’. Work reporting on 
empirical studies, typically employing content analysis-
based instruments for the recording of content, are usually 
unable to interrogate user perspectives, although these 
studies do provide the evidence that most categories of 
voluntary narrative were increasing over time. It was 
probably assumed that the intensification of scrutiny of the 
corporate sector generally was a major cause of increased 
reporting (Campbell 2004; Tilt 1994) but there was, until 
some time after Day’s call, little evidence of user 
perspectives on the increased disclosure.
While a small number of studies analyse non-economic 
stakeholders’ perceptions of reporting (eg Tilt 1994), the 
body of literature referred to in this report is concerned 
primarily with the reactions of stakeholders with an 
economic interest in the company. In particular, it refers to 
stock market participants’ reactions to different categories 
of disclosure. The most frequent inquiry reported upon is 
that of investment materiality.
Something is known about the general consumption of 
information in corporate annual reports following work by 
Bartlett and Chandler (1997), Lee and Tweedie (1975), and 
Rowbottom and Lymer (2007). Both Bartlett and Chandler 
(1997) and Lee and Tweedie (1975) examine the behaviour 
of private investors rather than professional analysts. Both 
studies find little evidence that the annual report is 
systematically read, but the Bartlett and Chandler study 
(1997) finds that more voluntary disclosure is neither 
needed nor used. They single out the corporate 
governance section for specific comment, saying (p. 254), 
‘the sections relating to corporate governance seem to 
have had little impact on shareholders, with 31.9% reading 
the directors’ statement of responsibility (but only 5.8% 
thoroughly), and even fewer (23.5%) reading the corporate 
governance section (though 8.8% read it thoroughly)’.
Rowbottom and Lymer (2007) use a website usage 
interrogation method to measure the download frequency 
of the major items in corporate annual reports, a method 
made possible by the fact that annual reports are broken 
down into downloadable ‘chunks’ on the websites. Based 
on a sample of 15 UK companies, Rowbottom and Lymer 
find that the most frequently downloaded items by all 
users (not distinguishing between types of annual report 
reader) are the compulsory financials. The least 
downloaded items include the chairman’s statement, the 
environmental report and the chief executive’s review. The 
data are shown in Table 2.1. The Rowbottom and Lymer 
(2007) study uses a cross-sectional sample of 15 
companies, and their results provide an interesting 
illustration of the relative importance of the different types 
of annual report disclosure.
The research carried out with the bank analysts, fully 
reported on in Chapter 5 of this report, confirms the lack 
of attention given to some of the lower ordered items such 
as the audit report, chairman’s statement and governance 
report. The contents of Table 2.1 and more specifically 
their order, should not be regarded as a ‘shopping list’ 
effect with the reader stopping when they have enough 
comfort in the ‘basket’. Rather, it signals the materiality 
placed by users on individual sections of the annual report 
and its use. Moreover, the relative apparent immateriality 
of these items is subsequently confirmed in the research 
findings when the issue of having no ‘front end’ reporting 
is discussed with the analysts. There is little evidence that 
analysts find the ‘front end’ content to be material but, 
perhaps more surprisingly, there is little evidence that the 
voluntary contents are a source of ‘comfort’ to them either.
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Table 2.1: Annual report Web pages requested by users, in order of download frequency (2003 and 2004)
Rank Item in annual report (in order of downloads) Type of disclosure
1 Income statement (P&L) Compulsory, financial
2 Notes to the accounts Compulsory, financial
3 Balance sheet Compulsory, financial
4 Segmental analysis Voluntary,1 financial
5 Shareholder information Voluntary, financial
6 Financial year highlights Voluntary, financial
7 Company profile Voluntary, narrative
8 Operating and financial review Voluntary, narrative, financial
9 Five year summary Voluntary, financial
10 Directors’ report Voluntary,2 narrative, financial
11 Corporate governance report Compulsory,3 narrative, financial
12 Directors’ biographies Voluntary, narrative
13 Remuneration report Compulsory,4 financial
14 Chairman’s statement Voluntary, narrative
15 Chief executive’s review Voluntary, narrative
16 Cash flow statement Compulsory, financial
17 Auditor’s report Compulsory, narrative
18 Statement of total recognised gains and losses Compulsory, financial
19 Environmental impacts Voluntary, narrative
20 Financial calendar Voluntary, chronographic
(Source: Rowbottom and Lymer 2007). 
1.  Segmental information is now a mandatory disclosure under IFRS 8.
2.  The Directors’ report is mandatory but much of the content is voluntary.
3.  Mandatory under listing rules under ‘comply or explain’ requirements.
4.  Mandatory under listing rules under ‘comply or explain’ requirements.
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3.1 cAlls foR ReseARch iN this AReA
In general terms, previous researchers have identified and 
stressed the significance of the lacuna addressed by this 
research. In an early study examining the materiality of 
social disclosures, Milne and Chan (1999: 440) suggest 
that, ‘little is known about the investment decision impact 
of narrative social disclosure that firms typically provide in 
their annual reports’.
More recent research has attempted to address the issue 
of voluntary narrative materiality but issues with direct 
access to information users have limited the reliability of 
findings. Ho and Wong (2004: 62) note that, ‘few empirical 
studies [have examined]… the information needs of users 
and whether current disclosures satisfy users’ needs’, 
while Robb et al. (2001: 80) suggest that, ‘further research 
about the usefulness of nonfinancial disclosures appears 
warranted’. Such calls were made in response to the 
limitations of previous research in interrogating the 
manner in which annual report narrative disclosures were 
actually consumed by users. Despite the studies described 
in the foregoing literature review, scholars in the area have 
been able to highlight the importance of the gap that this 
present study has attempted to address.
Parker (2005: 856) writes that, ‘in terms of the future 
shaping of the research field itself, there would appear to 
be ample room for further applications of direct researcher 
engagement in the field, via qualitative research’. Similarly, 
Lorraine et al. (2004: 23) remark that, ‘qualitative research 
which investigates companies’, investors’ and regulators’ 
perspectives on these issues (environmental issues and 
value relevance) would be worthwhile’. In particular, 
however, this present research attempts to interrogate 
views on a range of voluntary narratives, partly in response 
to Beattie et al.’s suggestion (2004: 233) that ‘it would be 
interesting to elicit from key user groups their views 
regarding... appropriate weightings to be assigned to each 
[voluntary non-financial disclosure]’. Accordingly, the 
importance placed by analysts on a range of categories of 
voluntary narratives is a key element in the research.
The remainder of this chapter examines the literature on 
the selected specific categories of voluntary disclosure 
probed in this research. It begins with that generally 
regarded as management commentary in nature and then 
proceeds to examine social and environmental disclosure.
3.2. mAteRiAlity of mANAgemeNt commeNtARy, 
discussioN ANd stRAtegy RePoRtiNg
A number of disclosure narratives in annual reports are 
ostensibly intended to provide information on management 
commentary, performance, strategy, and related issues 
within these general remits. In all cases, excepting corporate 
governance and a number of provisions concerning disclosure 
in the directors’ report, the content of these narratives is 
entirely within the editorial control of management. Unlike 
social and environmental narratives, which may contain 
information on non-financial or non-business related 
activities, management commentaries are all primarily 
concerned with business-related discussion.
Gray S. J. et al. (1995) suggest that voluntary disclosures 
can be considered to fall into three categories: strategic 
information, non-financial information and financial 
information. While ‘capital market pressures do seem to 
bear on financial reporting practices’ (Gray S. J. et al. 
1995: 46) in respect of the belief that the cost of capital is 
thought to be related to disclosure (Botosan 1997), a 
lacuna appears to exist in the understanding of the 
manner in which voluntary management commentary is 
consumed and processed.
In the context of the annual report, disclosures in what 
Gray S. J. et al. (1995) refer to as strategic and non-
financial, include the chairman’s statement (the content of 
which is voluntary), operating and executive review 
contents, risk reporting and governance issues. The 
potential importance of these items to investors is 
significant, although existing research has highlighted a 
lack of understanding of how the investment community 
uses the information. Flostrand and Strom (2006) note 
that, ‘the needs of users of business reports were no 
longer thought to be satisfied with...balance sheets and 
income statements... [but that] reports now had to include 
information relevant in predicting the future performance 
of the firm, whatever form or shape that information might 
have’ (Flostrand and Strom 2006: 582). They continue, 
‘whilst there are studies testing levels of disclosure it is not 
known whether this information is useful to one of the 
primary users of financial information, namely sell-side 
financial analysts’ (see also Vanstraelen et al. 2003).
Risk reporting, for example, is a relatively unexplored 
category of voluntary disclosure, partly because, as a 
separate section of the annual report, it is a relatively 
recent arrival. Whereas in earlier times, management 
might have mentioned risks in an unspecific, unsystematic 
or occasional manner, the idea underpinning a risk section 
of an annual report is partly that all the narrative on risk 
can be brought together in one place. The valuation of 
liabilities, provisions and contingencies remain, of course, 
an important part of the notes to the accounts but the 
description of risk takes place in the risk reporting section.
A typical risk section lists the risks that the company faces 
in relatively general terms and then may go on to explain, 
again in general terms, the way in which the risk will be 
managed by the company. This may include a note on the 
internal controls instituted to mitigate internally the effects 
of the risk. Despite the development of these separate 
sections, however, academic research has been generally 
critical of the information content of risk narrative. In 
particular, that it is too general and contains insufficient 
information in terms of a quantitative assessment of either 
the probability of the risk or the impact of the hazard (ie 
what would happen if the risk event was realised).
Linsley and Shrives (2005) examine risk disclosure in UK 
annual reports and find that companies did not provide a 
complete picture of their risks in that ‘there is minimal 
disclosure of quantified risk information’ (Linsley and 
Shrives 2005: 292). Similarly, Woods (2004) finds that, 
‘narrative [risk] disclosures are generic in nature... and 
current UK reporting practices are of limited help to users’ 
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(Woods 2004: 373). Linsley et al. (2006) find that, ‘general 
statements of risk management policy dominate the risk 
disclosures (which are not as useful as specific risk or risk 
management information)’ (Linsley et al. 2006: 280), and 
they conclude that, ‘overall the dominance of statements of 
general risk management policy and a lack of coherence in 
the risk narratives implies that a risk information gap exists 
and consequently stakeholders are unable to adequately 
assess the risk profile of a company’ (p. 387). Schrand and 
Elliot (1998) point to the voluntary nature and the lack of 
accounting standards in risk reporting and conclude that 
companies have no incentive for voluntary disclosures of 
risk and that risk disclosure, accordingly, is incomplete.
The chairman’s statement, similarly, has received a limited 
amount of attention in the literature. Aerts (1994) 
identifies the chairman’s statement as an opportunity that 
companies sometimes take to make ‘systematically biased’ 
(Aerts 1994: 341) statements and to issue narrative that 
can be ‘coloured’ to manage news disclosure in the company’s 
favour. In a later paper (2005), Aerts uses the term, 
‘self-serving attributional bias’ to describe the impression-
management efforts that companies, and chairmen in 
particular, use to manipulate audiences in respect of a 
particular interpretation of events. Courtis (1998) exercises 
similar language, referring to the chairman’s statement 
narrative when introducing the ‘obfuscation hypothesis’.
There does not appear to be any agreement among 
scholars as to actual materiality of the chairman’s 
statement, and one reason for this is the intrinsic bias 
assumed to be a feature. Bettman and Weitz (1983) and 
D’Aveni and MacMillan (1990) produce contradictory 
findings when examining the text of chairmen’s statements 
in companies that later went on to become bankrupt, 
indicating that the text and language style are not related to 
success or failure. Clatworthy and Jones (2001) challenge 
Courtis’s obfuscation hypothesis when investigating the 
readability of chairman’s statements in the UK. They 
cannot confirm the finding that disclosures of bad news 
were more difficult to read than good news. Smith and 
Taffler (1995), conversely, suggest that the narrative is a 
potential indicator of performance, although the messages 
conveyed by the chairman tend to embellish reality. They 
imply deliberate obfuscation attempts in communicating 
bad news. In another study, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) 
conclude that the chairman’s statement is a source of 
‘useful information about the future of the company’ 
(Abrahamson and Amir 1996: 1179). 
The evidence for the usefulness of the chairman’s 
statement is therefore mixed. While it can, in principle, be 
used to convey important strategic information to readers, 
academic studies that have content analysed chairmen’s 
statements have found that they can be used for conveying 
biased content or messages that are ambiguous in terms of 
the future prospects of the business. The apparent scepticism 
in which the chairman’s statement is viewed may be one of 
the causes of its seeming relative decline in importance in 
recent decades. Examining the relative importance of 
information sources used by analysts, the chairman’s 
statement is ranked sixth most important item in an 
annual report by Lee and Tweedie (1981) and fourth by 
Arnold and Moizer (1984). Day (1986) finds that the 
chairman’s statement is ranked twenty-first as an item in 
the annual report referred to by analysts. Although 
(admittedly) not a direct comparison, Rowbottom and 
Lymer’s study covering 2003/04 (Rowbottom and Lymer 
2007) ranks the chairman’s statement fourteenth, perhaps 
confirming a relegation of perception of this item in the 
minds of annual report readers.
3.3. mAteRiAlity of sociAl ANd eNViRoNmeNtAl 
RePoRtiNg (geNeRAlly)
As one of the most researched areas of voluntary 
reporting, social and environmental reporting has been 
studied from a range of angles and perspectives.
There is mixed evidence from the literature on the 
investment materiality of social and environmental (SE) 
disclosure. In an early call for research in this area, Dierkes 
and Antal (1985: 30) argue that, ‘the ultimate test for the 
usefulness of social and environmental reporting 
information is its impact on decision making’ and quite 
rightly note that at the time of their study there was ‘a 
dearth of information on which to base an assessment of 
usefulness of this [social and environmental accounting].’ 
Those studies finding generally in favour of SE disclosure 
being of material interest to investors include Miles et al. 
(2002) and Solomon and Solomon (2006). Further, Murray 
et al. (2006: 229) find that, ‘although social and 
environmental disclosure may not yet be an obviously 
substantive part of mainstream corporate activity, it is a 
growing concern to all parties.’
Solomon and Solomon (2006) examine the extent to which 
social, ethical and environmental (SEE) disclosure is 
integrated into institutional investment. Specifically, the 
study seeks to evaluate the, ‘decision-usefulness of public 
SEE disclosure’. Based on interviews with 21 buy-side 
institutional investors, their findings include the 
observation that, ‘there is not enough SEE information 
provided in company annual reports... [and there is] strong 
evidence that SEE information was decision-useful and 
would continue to grow in importance’ (Solomon and 
Solomon 2006: 573). Miles et al. (2002) find a growing 
demand for SEE disclosure from the investment 
community and suggest that, ‘demand for SEE information 
has been growing over time’. Further, Miles et al. (2002) 
argue that SEE disclosure is being increasingly used by 
institutional investors, underpinning a need to improve the 
quality and quantity of such disclosure in annual reports.
The stronger evidence from previous research is that which 
has found largely that SE disclosure is not investment-
material in nature. The assumption made appears to be 
largely that SE disclosure is marginal, ‘tagged on’, or so 
perfunctory in content that the information it contains is 
scarcely of relevance to an investor audience (such as 
analysts). Murray et al.’s conclusions (2006: 246) include 
the reflection that, ‘if further evidence could be gathered 
to suggest that markets can be persuaded to start to see 
the social and environmental implications of their financial 
decisions then… social and environmental disclosure 
[would] become a regular, significant and regulated part of 
corporate disclosure.’
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Ho and Wong (2004) report on annual reports usage by 
Hong Kong-based investment analysts and find very little 
interest in non-financial voluntary disclosures, including 
social and environmental narratives. Beattie and Pratt 
(2002) report the views of analysts, shareholders, financial 
directors and audit partners of a range of disclosure items. 
Financial objectives and strategy are found to be the most 
useful ‘with environmental, social and community trailing a 
long way behind... [and] not seen to be relevant to the 
investment decision’ (Beattie and Pratt 2002: 1)
Milne and Chan (1999) examine the usefulness of social 
disclosures from annual reports for investment decision-
making and find that in some situations, the provision of 
social disclosure may be associated with fund allocation 
decisions away from the company disclosing social 
information. In a paper-based test (ie not involving face-to-
face interviews), analysts allocated ‘on average 7% of their 
funds away from the firm that provides corporate social 
disclosure’ (Milne and Chan (1999: 450). They conclude 
that, ‘overall, the results from this study suggest corporate 
narrative social disclosures do not make much difference 
to investors’ decision making’ (p. 451) and, ‘only when 
corporate social disclosure [has] a significant impact on 
future cashflow will it be perceived as useful’ (p. 452)
In a similar study analysing the news direction (good or 
bad news) of social and environmental disclosures, Chan 
and Milne (1999) note that: ‘UK City analysts… are driven 
by the requirements of their clients, which they interpret to 
be primarily a positive financial outcome on the clients’ 
investments. Issues considered moral or emotional are not 
seen as part of the analyst’s remit’ (Chan and Milne 1999: 
266). Deegan and Rankin (1997) find that social, and 
especially environmental, information is important to some 
non-institutional investors but, notably, is of little 
importance to investment analysts. 
3.4. mAteRiAlity of eNViRoNmeNtAl RePoRtiNg 
(sPecificAlly)
Whereas many previous studies do not disaggregate the 
narrative-containing content referring to a range of social 
and environmental, community, health, safety and ethical 
issues, a number do seek specifically to examine the 
effects of environmental narratives on users of annual 
reports. There are mixed findings on the actual or potential 
investment materiality of environmental disclosures.
n an industry-specific study, Blacconiere and Patten 
(1994) analyse whether share prices are systematically 
affected by environmental disasters. They find that, from a 
sample of 47 firms, companies with extensive 
environmental disclosure prior to the Bhopal incident in 
1984 experienced a less negative market reaction to the 
disaster than their counterparts in the chemicals industry 
who communicated very little about environmental 
matters. It is this use of environmental disclosure as a part 
of an organisation’s risk management profile that is most 
often considered to be the most ‘useful’ use of 
environmental disclosure as far as analysts are concerned. 
Studies that have found a link between environmental 
issues and value relevance include Hughes (2000) and 
Lorraine et al. (2004), although the value of environmental 
disclosures was not always supported in terms of value 
relevance. But, even then, the evidence is scant that 
environmental disclosures are material in normal market 
conditions (ie without the perturbations caused by a 
Bhopal or an Exxon Valdez). 
Deegan and Rankin (1997) find that social and especially 
environmental information is important to non-institutional 
investors but of little importance to investment analysts. 
Deegan and Rankin (1999) report that, ‘BiE [Business in 
the Environment] provided evidence that London based 
financial analysts considered the environmental performance 
of corporations to be largely irrelevant in determining the 
investments to recommend to their clients’ (Deegan and 
Rankin (1999: 326). They continue, ‘while 73.3% of 
shareholders and 75% of accounting academics seek this 
information, stockbrokers and analysts were significantly 
less likely to seek environmental information within the 
annual report than any other group of users’ (p. 329).
A study highly relevant to the research described in this 
report is Thompson and Cowton (2004). They examine the 
interface between bank lending and demand for 
environmental information while arguing that there is a 
strong case for banks to have a particularly acute exposure 
to environmental issues. The reason for this enhanced 
exposure, is, they argue, because of the potential risks a 
bank could become exposed to as a result of its lending. 
This argument represents a fundamental challenge to the 
assumptions made in some studies that banking can be 
considered a ‘clean’ rather than a ‘dirty’ industry because its 
direct activities have relatively little environmental impact.
Thompson and Cowton (2004) identify three types of 
environmental risk that might have an impact upon a 
bank. Direct environmental risk is that arising from liability 
for the remediation of environmental damage to property 
it has obtained, perhaps by a loan default or similar. 
Indirect exposure, which Thompson and Cowton suggest is 
the most common, arises when a company holding loan 
capital from the lending bank goes out of business as a 
result of its own environmental risk, perhaps arising from a 
lawsuit or the costs of implementing a new environmental 
standard or similar. The difference, as far as the bank is 
concerned, between direct and indirect exposure is one of 
the limits of liability. For direct risk, the potential liability 
may be greater than the initial loan amount – for indirect 
risk, the liability is limited to the amount already lent. A 
third category of risk linked to the environment is more 
difficult to measure but perhaps the most important – that 
of derived reputational risk (Buxton 1997).
In summary, this research attempts to address a number 
of the calls for additional research in this area by engaging 
with a primary annual report user group. The research 
provides insights into the relative importance of voluntary 
disclosures that have been widely used in the 
underpinning literature, covering, among other things, risk, 
social and environmental issues, strategy and governance.
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4.1 ReseARch questioNs
The research questions raised in this studies, in response 
to the calls from previous studies, concern the materiality 
and usefulness of narrative disclosures to sell-side 
analysts, who are a significant user group of accounting 
information in the investment supply chain. In particular, it 
was decided that evidence should be sought on the 
narratives that have constituted the major part of the 
academic interest in narrative reporting, which are:
the chairman’s statement and strategy reporting•	
risk reporting•	
social and environmental disclosure•	
corporate governance content•	
the importance of narrative reporting generally.•	
It was helpful, when guiding each discussion with the 
analysts, to divide the conversation into sections, which 
meant introducing each ‘category’ of voluntary disclosure 
and asking specifically about that. To this end, social and 
environmental disclosures and governance disclosures 
were discussed separately with the analysts rather than 
combining them. This approach is consistent with previous 
and current literature reflecting two distinct areas of study. 
While there may be overlaps between the two categories, 
this could be the same for any of the voluntary disclosure 
areas, for instance risk and governance. In keeping with 
the objectives of the research, it was necessary to identify 
and discuss individual categories of voluntary disclosure 
and to gather evidence on their usefulness or otherwise to 
analysts as information users. To combine categories 
would serve to lose this detail and resolution of opinion. 
The chairman’s statement is voluntary although universally 
adopted and there is no mandatory content prescription. 
Corporate governance disclosure, which has grown in 
volume substantially in recent years, is required in the UK 
under the provisions of the relevant corporate governance 
codes (notably by the contents of the FRC’s Combined 
Code 2003) under ‘comply or explain’. Risk reporting, 
social, community and environmental reporting are 
entirely voluntary, although some companies wishing to 
comply with voluntary reporting frameworks such as the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) may include some content 
to ensure compliance.
A more problematic issue to resolve was the sectoral 
representation of the analysts in the sample. While a broad 
sectoral sample would superficially appear to be a 
desirable quality of the sample, it was preferred instead to 
concentrate on just one, albeit major, sector for the study. 
This was for two main reasons.
First, a single sectoral representation would enable intra-
industry observations to be made, the reliability of which 
would increase with repetition by sample members. 
Second, it would enable the information needs of one 
particular cohort of sectoral analysts to be examined in 
detail, which would not be possible were analysts to be 
drawn from across a range of sectors. Additionally, with 
the numbers of London-based sell-side analysts 
representing the major investment houses in any given 
sector being relatively low, it was a happy possibility that 
the sample chosen for interview would approximate to the 
population, thus providing the maximum possible 
reliability of findings for that sector, given the number of 
participating bank analysts in the research. In total 19 
sell-side banking analysts were interviewed. As at July 
2008, Alliance and Leicester plc listed individual analysts 
in 18 firms that provided analyst coverage and Barclays 
plc provided a similar list of 23 firms. All the analysts 
interviewed for this research were from firms named as 
providing coverage.
The four major ‘volume’ areas of analysis in London are 
technology, pharmaceuticals, oil/gas and banks. For this 
study, it was decided to focus attention on the analysts of 
UK banks. This was for two reasons. First, it would facilitate 
the interrogation of the perspectives and views of a high 
proportion of the London-based analysts of a strategically 
important sector for the UK and European economy (see 
Centre for Economics and Business Research 2007). In 
terms of market values as at the end of 2007, banks 
represented approximately 15% of the total FTSE 100 
value.1 Second, there are ample reasons why all the 
narrative disclosures under consideration in this research 
could be material and/or useful to investors. The 
chairman’s statement may contain important strategy 
disclosure; risk reporting may contain risks previously 
unknown to analysts that are capable of affecting returns, 
while social and environmental reporting may affect the 
bank’s risk exposure (depending on the environmental 
risks associated with loans) and the reputation of the bank 
as a responsible social and environmental ‘citizen’. 
Corporate governance is potentially the most perfunctory 
of the reporting categories taking into account that 
compliance with the Combined Code can be considered a 
‘box-ticking’ exercise.
4.2 method
It was necessary to gain access to a number of analysts so 
as to establish their views on the subjects of the research 
questions. In order to identify a cohort of analysts to 
approach, the list of analysts that covered Alliance & 
Leicester plc was used as a starting point (the list was, 
happily, available on the Alliance & Leicester website). On 
contacting the analysts on the list by telephone, it became 
clear that most also covered other UK high street retail 
banks and it emerged that the list was a fair approximation 
to the population of UK bank analysts in the City of 
London. 
1. Based on banks’ collective valuation of £212 billion against a 
FTSE 100 value of £1,472 billion.
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On having the nature of the project briefly explained to 
them over the phone, all but one of the analysts on the list 
agreed to be interviewed. The interviews took place at the 
London office of each analyst between the autumn of 2004 
and the summer of 2006. Once a small number of analysts 
had been removed from consideration for reasons of 
non-availability (such as retirement, career moves, etc.), 
the number of possible suitable analysts was 20. Allowing 
for the one refusal, the final number of analysts 
interviewed for the project was 19. Each analyst was 
interviewed by one or both of the two researchers 
conducting the study.
At the start of each interview, the analyst was initially 
assured that his or her evidence would be fully 
anonymised and accordingly, they could speak freely on 
their views about the matters in question. After that, a 
recent annual report of a bank covered by the analyst was 
produced by the interviewer and the analyst was invited to 
describe how they would use the document if that was the 
first time they had seen it.
The Alliance & Leicester plc annual report and accounts 
for year end 2003 was used for this purpose. This was for 
two reasons. First, it contained examples of all of the 
categories of narrative disclosure being studied and 
second, it was manageable in size in comparison with 
some of the other, substantially more voluminous tomes 
that are produced by some banks (notably by HSBC).
The analysts spoke uninterrupted for as long as they 
wanted in response to the first request. Following that, a 
number of follow-up questions were asked to establish 
each analyst’s views on the usefulness, and more 
specifically on the materiality, of each disclosure category 
and of narrative reporting in general to them as analysts. 
In this respect, each encounter was similar to a semi-
structured interview in terms of research method. A 
standard list of questions was asked, clarifications were 
sought and occasional tangential diversions were indulged 
in. Each encounter was good-natured and cordial 
containing both informal and semi-formal exchanges. All 
interviews were recorded in their entirety and 
subsequently transcribed. A typical encounter lasted a 
total of one hour.
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5.1 the cohoRt ANd geNeRAl PeRcePtioNs of the 
ANNuAl RePoRt
The cohort of analysts interviewed for this research had an 
average of 8.5 years’ experience in the job. The majority 
were not professionally qualified in accounting although all 
were qualified to degree level or higher. The most common 
academic backgrounds of interviewees were (in order) 
economics, maths, finance, accounting and law.
Almost all the analysts interviewed discussed the 
limitations of the annual report in terms of the timing of its 
publication. While the year-end results are accompanied 
by the preliminary accounts (‘prelims’, which include 
narrative contents), the final printed version of the annual 
report and accounts is often not published until some 
weeks later, by which time the information in the prelims 
has formed the basis of the analysts’ forecasts. This 
publication lag significantly reduces the usefulness of the 
final document as an investment-material source of 
information. The detail in the preliminaries and the 
information conveyed by management at the results 
presentation are far more important in the intervening 
period.
Analyst A2 noted:
On the basis that you get your report and accounts after 
you’ve already had the preliminary results, you are two 
months down the line from when you were actually given 
the specific… information in the preliminary results
Analyst A5 stated bluntly:
Well I wouldn’t use that document [the annual report] to 
start with because… the results typically come out in 
February and this is published in April. So is it a major 
event? No.
Analyst A16:
From my point of view the annual report rarely gets used 
in the way I’ve just described … to you [which was a 
detailed illustration of how each section could be 
technically used]. To me it’s more a way of getting hard 
detail and you know by the time it’s out it’s been fully 
audited and there’s no way that they’re going to revise 
anything.
Most, however, took a less strident view than this, with the 
majority referring to the document variously as potentially 
important for new information that is most likely to be in 
the detail and possibly in the notes to the accounts. In this 
regard, it is used as a historical document that contains 
more detail than the preliminaries.
Analyst A5 went on to say:
Now where the annual report comes in far more useful is 
where, for instance, you say, have Barclays or Royal Bank 
of Scotland. The companies… don’t publish their annual 
report on the actual day. You therefore go back to it … to 
look through things in a lot more detail in terms of that 
kind of information.
Despite the limitations caused by the publication lag, the 
contents of the annual report in general were considered 
by most to be potentially highly material to the investment 
decision, although the cohort differed substantially in the 
use they made of the document.
Analyst A12’s remark was typical:
I would say it’s highly material. As an analyst there are 
two opportunities each year to really understand how a 
company’s doing. One is the interim results; one is the 
final results. And most of our forecast revision, most of 
our recommendation changes I think are driven by what 
management say at either or both of the results 
presentations. I would place a high reliance on the annual 
report. The model which drives our recommendations is 
basically the annual report but extrapolated, so it’s crucial 
to the model. So I place a high reliance on it and would 
say it’s a very important document indeed.
Analyst A14’s criticism was less to do with the publication 
timing and rather more to do with their increased length 
and complexity. Commenting especially on HSBC’s 
weighty annual report, Analyst A14 remarked:
To be honest the annual report bit would probably score 
pretty lowly [in terms of usefulness to me]: a 1 or a 2 
[out of 10]. I’ve given up on how many times I’ve got [this 
sort of] message back from HSBC in response to my 
question: ‘If you go to the US disclosure no. 4, page 232 
then you’ll find the answer to your question’. Great, fine, 
but actually I’m still going to continue to email you even if 
all you do is give me the reference of where it is, because 
I’m not going to read… there’s just way too much to read. 
Analyst A16 also commented on the increased length not 
necessarily being helpful.
This is where banks sometimes get a bit confused 
because you ask for better disclosure and they think ‘oh, 
look, we’ve given you 600 pages already’ [which contains] 
575 pages of completely worthless guff. What we really 
want is granularity and in the areas that matter.
5.2 use of fiNANciAl iNfoRmAtioN
One of the prominent emphases made by all the analysts 
in the sample was the overwhelming importance placed 
upon the numerical financial data in annual reports. This 
was not a surprising finding insofar as one of the main 
roles of an analyst is to forecast the key financial statistics 
over the forthcoming period, and the recent history of 
those statistics is therefore of utmost interest.
The initial part of each meeting with the analysts was 
spent asking each interviewee to talk through, in their own 
words and in their own time, how they would begin to 
consume the information in the annual report if that had 
been the first time they had seen that document. This 
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enabled each analyst to highlight what was, to him or her, 
the section of most material immediate interest. It came as 
no surprise that each analyst went straight to the 
financials.
The order varied among the cohort, but in almost all cases, 
the first ‘port of call’ was either the income statement or 
the notes to the accounts. The balance sheet was 
considered less important in most situations than the 
income statement and the cash flow statement was 
generally viewed as less material again. Analyst A1 
reported that, ‘To be honest as bank analysts we don’t 
tend to look at the cash flow statement too much.’ 
Segmental disclosure was, however, highly valued.
The relative importance of the income statement for 
earnings and costs forecasts was emphasised by most of 
the cohort. Analyst A16 was relatively dismissive of the 
balance sheet in comparison.
I don’t spend a lot of time digging through the balance 
sheet. I certainly don’t try and forecast the balance sheet 
on a line-by-line basis [as I do with the income 
statement].
Analyst A14 was typical in describing the general approach 
taken.
My normal first port of call is to go into the notes to the 
accounts because this is the additional disclosure to the 
prelims… and in particular I’m interested in the balance 
sheet at the consolidated level and the cash flow at the 
consolidated level and therefore I would go through the 
notes to the accounts.
Similarly, Analyst A7 remarked as follows.
P & L accounts, the balance sheet, the notes and in 
particular the financial review which obviously gives some 
sort of qualitative discussion around the numbers to at 
least give some sort of context and explanations in terms 
of why particular numbers in the accounts and the 
income statement, etc. have moved in the way in which 
they do.
A15 explained the purpose of the financial analysis as 
trying to get ‘a feel for the underlying situation of the 
company and even then you’ll find that some of the 
numbers we probably will disregard. We will have our own 
way of calculating [financial statistics]’.
There was a general scepticism about reported figures 
among most of the cohort. Financial ratios given by the 
reporting company were never taken at ‘face value’ and 
other figures were frequently added back to reported costs 
and earnings to arrive at what the analysts considered a 
more reliable figure. Analyst A16, for example, referred to 
having to ‘dig deeper to strip out any of the one-off effects 
or to get a feel for what the trends are’.
5.3 Views oN the ‘fRoNt eNd’ ANd geNeRAl 
NARRAtiVe RePoRtiNg iN the ANNuAl RePoRt
It was when discussing the annual report content other 
than the financials that differences of opinion between 
analysts began to become evident. This is the section of 
the annual report that has seen the most growth over 
recent years, as companies have included more and more 
information on various aspects of their business apart 
from the purely financial. In this context, ‘front end’ 
includes the collective disclosures that take narrative 
rather than numerical form. Asking each analyst their view 
on this was intended to gain evidence of their overall views 
on the importance of narrative reporting in general. In 
most cases, the ‘front end’ includes the chairman’s 
statement, possibly a chief executive’s review, an operating 
review, corporate governance disclosure, risk disclosure, 
health, safety, social and environmental disclosure, and 
various other narratives that companies include on an ad 
hoc basis.
This section of the annual report would theoretically be of 
interest when the information sought is not available in 
– or cannot be expressed by – the financial information. In 
practice, much of what is in the narrative sections is 
content already seen in the preliminaries so it suffers from 
the same time lag limitation as other content of the annual 
report as a whole.
Opinions on the materiality and usefulness of ‘front end’ 
narrative reporting were mixed in the cohort of analysts.
Analyst A2 spoke for the majority in viewing the contents 
of the ‘front end’ as template driven.
You almost can get slightly cynical about the questions of 
box-ticking by executives and what the reasons are for 
doing that. I would guess that generally, in terms of 
reporting and information provided, they tend to stick 
together as a pack [meaning the categories they 
disclose are very similar].
Analyst A13 expressed a similar view.
But in terms of the sections which are solid text in terms 
of, say, ‘our policy’ as regards the environment or our 
employees or our shareholders – most of that tends to be 
template-driven stuff.
Analyst A9 said that the narrative form of the ‘front end’ 
was one of the reasons for its not being widely used by 
analysts.
There are things that need to be here and maybe once 
every three years you might [read it] because you have a 
specific issue and you go here [to find something out]. If 
I get this report would I look at it in great detail? No. But 
where we come from we are much more about numbers 
– I want to see the numbers.
Analyst A15 suggested that there may be an audience 
issue with the materiality of ‘front end’ narrative reporting, 
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referring to the information needs of independent 
shareholders (not dealing through fund managers) and the 
specific information needs of analysts.
If you are looking at it as an independent shareholder you 
will concentrate, as I say, on the first 30 pages of the 
blurb. As an analyst, given that we probably know all of 
that…the first 30 pages will probably never get read.
Interviewer: ‘So front end voluntary? Not interested?’
Completely not interested. I could probably say that I 
have not read any of those.
Analyst A10 expressed a similar view, saying, ‘it is 
exceptionally rare that I’d actually look at anything in the 
front pages’, while Analyst A14 saw most of the ‘front end’ 
as something that might be perused briefly but then kept 
as a source of information: 
The director’s report largely is a skip-through. As I say it’s 
not something I would go to and read specifically first but 
its good to have it there as a reference.
Analyst A4 was critical of the perfunctory and redundant 
nature of some of the narrative contents.
There’s a lot of rubbish actually that could have been in 
there [the Alliance & Leicester annual report] but 
wasn’t. HSBC are swines for bulking the whole thing out 
[with less than useful content].
Analyst A8 was critical of the narrative content of the 
reports because of potential issues that could arise owing 
not only to undisclosed management motives but also to 
audit requirements.
Those [narrative sections] are read with a sceptical eye 
because companies rarely admit when things are going 
wrong until they’ve gone so badly wrong that the 
management who’d got them wrong have been fired and 
the new guys come in and [say] ‘oh that was a terrible 
idea’. But yes, of course, a lot of the feel for what’s going 
on in the business is up front, not down the back [of the 
report] but as we discussed, the segmental reports are 
unaudited so they’re at the front not the back generally. 
Analyst A8 went on to describe some of the concerns with 
narrative reporting generally.
I would say companies consistently strive to position 
themselves in a favourable light, so that you have 
discretion to describe things as you see them and to put 
more emphasis on the things that are going well than the 
things that are going less well. So [while]… I would 
absolutely not… accuse the companies of lying, I would 
accuse the companies of indulging in self-promotion. 
Despite these misgivings, however, the consensus overall 
view was that the ‘front end’ was capable of containing 
content of material use to analysts. Analyst A17 gave an 
example of this.
But what we look for in there is any statement about the 
outlook and any statement about management or on 
targets. That is actually very important.
The importance of strategy content in the annual report is 
discussed in the next section.
5.4 chAiRmAN’s stAtemeNt ANd stRAtegy 
disclosuRe
The chairman’s statement is one of the most-discussed 
and researched elements of the annual report ‘front end’ 
in the literature. It has been analysed in terms of 
readability, bias and news direction (see in the discussion 
of the literature above). There is neither prescription in 
company law nor listing rules about the content of the 
chairman’s statement. In practice, chairmen have typically 
used the statement (or ‘letter’) as a vehicle for 
summarising the previous year’s performance, to highlight 
any key changes, to acknowledge those who have 
contributed to any successes and to comment on ‘going 
concern’ and future prospect issues over the subsequent 
year.
Analyst A13 summarised the importance of the chairman’s 
statement in the annual report.
Well, I think he [the chairman] has a moral duty… to 
communicate with shareholders, to put his name to the 
annual report and say ‘this is mine’ and ‘I’m upfront and 
this is how I’m leading the organisation’. The second 
reason would be that they will have a significant number 
of shareholders whose only substantive communication 
with the company will be this [document, the annual 
report] every year: people who own the stock on their 
own account and who are not sophisticated followers of 
the market.
While the majority of the cohort of analysts made 
comments similar to those of Analyst A13, there was a 
considerable and prevailing expression of scepticism over 
the value of the content. The most oft-cited reason for this 
scepticism was the lack of strategy content and, for this 
reason, most analysts compared the chairman’s statement 
unfavourably with the usually more detailed chief 
executive’s review.
In the quest for greater detail and granularity, most of the 
analysts were dismissive of the chairman’s statement as 
less than material, with some reserving some relatively 
unmeasured language for it.
Analyst A3 began by commenting that the chairman’s 
statement was ‘bloody irrelevant’ before proceeding to 
clarify this remark by citing the sections of a typical 
chairman’s statement.
Well the chairman’s statement tends not to [contain 
strategy] does it? ‘Economic outlook’, well, thank you I’ve 
got a fair idea myself. ‘Results’ I can read. ‘Capital and 
dividend’ I know you’re double A-rated or whatever. ‘Our 
people’, ‘Board changes’, ‘Realising our potential’: yes. I 
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suppose ‘Realising our potential’ could have been 
interesting [but wasn’t].
Analyst A13 provided a helpful summary of the way in 
which most analysts view the chairman’s statement.
Well, we certainly read it but I’ve yet to read one that  
tells us anything that we either weren’t told at an 
analysts’ meeting two months before the financials came 
out or that isn’t part of a communicated strategy that’s 
been around for ages. So you look at the two pages that 
we have here from the chairman: ‘Economic outlook’ – we 
have economists that do that; ‘Results of the company’ 
would have been enunciated at their meeting and we 
would know all about that; ‘Capital and dividend’ is 
extraordinarily important for [a bank] and so we would 
have a look at that but again because it’s so important. 
Typically the wording we won’t have seen before – that 
would be the most important component of that. ‘Our 
people are valued’ [and] ‘Board changes’, again, tend not 
to be all that material particularly when it’s on the 
non-executive side of things. ‘Realising our potential’,  
you know, I hope they do!
Analyst A13 said that the chairman’s statement ‘isn’t the 
place where you’re going to see a change in policy or a 
change in strategy.’ Analyst A9 said it was ‘too woolly; it 
doesn’t tell you much’. Analyst A7 spoke for the majority, 
referring to its potential materiality as ‘limited’, while 
Analyst A15 preferred the term ‘useless’. Similarly, Analyst 
A4 remarked, ‘nine times out of ten [the chairman’s 
statement] would be useless’ with similar disdain by 
Analyst A5, who simply said, ‘I tend not to focus on this as 
an analyst’. Analyst A14, perhaps with a little 
overstatement for effect said, ‘I don’t think that I’ve ever 
read one’. Another direct criticism was made by Analyst 
A16 who said, ‘I find [it] usually not that helpful... I tend not 
to focus hugely on the chairman’s statement.’ When, in 
conclusion, Analyst A12 was asked, ‘So is the chairman’s 
statement immaterial for the most part?’, the reply was, ‘I 
think so, yes’. Analyst A4 concluded that the chairman’s 
statement was ‘worthless as far as I’m concerned’.
The most usual reason for the dismissal of the chairman’s 
statement as a material and useful disclosure was its lack 
of detail and its cursory treatment of information on the 
company’s strategy. For this reason, some analysts 
compared it unfavourably with the often more useful (and, 
in contrast to the chairman’s statement, voluntary) chief 
executive’s review. The fact that this particular piece of 
voluntary narrative has effectively become a fixture of the 
annual report, typically under an ‘operating and financial 
review’ section or similar, was greatly welcomed.
Analyst A12 remarked, ‘The chairman’s statement I’d sort 
of regard as a slightly watered down version of the CE’s 
statement,’ while Analyst A16 commented, ‘what the chief 
executive says is definitely more interesting and more 
relevant to me’. Analyst A3’s comment was based on the 
Alliance & Leicester plc 2003 accounts that were used as a 
basis for the discussion:
The strategy bit of the chairman’s statement is like those 
five column inches. You turn over to what [the CEO] is 
saying [which includes] ‘management priorities, 
managing the portfolio, maintaining building, profitability, 
position…’ I mean you’ve got a full two pages overleaf 
from the CEO.
Analyst A4 highlighted the typical content of the chief 
executive’s report in explaining its usefulness:
Chief Executive’s review – more interesting [than the 
chairman’s statement]. [I] wouldn’t necessarily read that 
first but probably would try and read it, not least because 
that usually is where you get them admitting to missing 
targets or saying what targets they’ve made and that’s 
where you get targets for the future.
A similar remark was made by Analyst A18: ‘[The chief 
executive’s statement] usually has a brief summary of 
what’s happened in the year past and any big events that 
they expect for the next year.’
5.5 Risk disclosuRe
Risk disclosure and risk management information are two 
of the most notable additions to the voluntary content of 
annual reports since the mid-1990s. Whereas previously, 
company officers might have made reference, in an 
unsystematic manner, to risks as part of their overall 
discussion, the segregation of risk information into a 
dedicated section is a relatively recent innovation. The 
banks’ reports that were discussed during conversations 
with the analysts were typical of other annual reports in 
containing a separate page or more of narrative reporting 
on this subject.
In almost all cases, risk reporting in the ‘front end’ of the 
annual report is entirely narrative in nature, and numbers, 
where relevant, are confined to the notes to the accounts. 
In the Alliance & Leicester accounts that were used as the 
basis for discussion, the risk reporting comprised narrative 
sections on operational risk, credit risk, market risk, 
interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, equity risk, 
liquidity risk and derivatives. Each section contained a 
definition of the type of risk in question and this was 
usually followed by an indication of company policy in 
respect of the risk and typical actions taken to gather 
intelligence on it. The discussion of operational risk in the 
Alliance and Leicester accounts, for example, contained 
three paragraphs that respectively began: ‘Operational risk 
is defined as…’, ‘The Group monitors its operational risk 
through a variety of techniques…’ and ‘Operational risk is 
managed through a combination of internal controls…’
While recognising that this narrative tends to be template 
driven, the analysts expressed a range of opinions on this 
particular category of narrative reporting. Although, prima 
facie, risk disclosure might be considered to be naturally 
material in the banking sector, the majority of analysts 
expressed scepticism about narrative risk reporting in the 
annual report. A typical opinion was that risk reporting 
was simply a boiler-plating or a box-ticking exercise 
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performed annually by companies without any real 
attempt to report either on the actual changes in risk 
exposure over the year or as anticipated in the year ahead. 
Most of the analysts relied on their own sector-relevant 
knowledge of banking risks and risk management, and 
viewed disclosure as being, for the most part, meaningless 
to them. Moreover, the levels of disclosure were often 
regarded as being too simplistic for analysts on the one 
hand but perhaps too complex for the individual non-
specialist investor on the other. In this respect, it was 
suggested that risk reporting failed as a material 
disclosure for both types of annual report user. Analyst A5 
pointed to the pro forma-driven content and suggested 
that, ‘if I as an analyst didn’t know what the risks were in a 
bank I wouldn’t be employed by the bank I work for.’
Referring to the risk narrative, Analyst A5 continued, ‘that’s 
generic what’s written there, and it’s probably not even a 
very good description of [risk] to someone who didn’t 
really understand [such as an independent investor]. Does 
it really tell you anything? No.’ One possible reason for the 
limitations of risk narrative content was suggested by 
Analyst A18 who said, ‘the risk section… should be more 
interesting but it usually tends not to be because they 
never give anything away and that is the problem’. Analyst 
A11 remarked that, ‘a lot of it is stating the obvious a lot of 
the time’ and Analyst A12 opined, ‘I think it’s mostly 
common sense’.
Frustration with the shallow and perfunctory nature of risk 
content was raised by several analysts. Analyst A4 made a 
general criticism:
then we are immediately into risk management and 
control, which is almost always useless. So we’ve got 
pages on foreign exchange rates, tax derivatives and 
uses. Realistically there is nothing that you can say from 
the outside about how someone else’s treasury is 
working. This stuff is just completely useless.
Analyst A3:
For people who are risk management fetishists, I’m sure 
it’s good to have and in terms of ticking boxes [and] it 
seems to be a useful exercise. This must be infuriating for 
the banks having to do [this] because they’ll probably sit 
there, roll their eyes and scribble down whatever fits the 
relevant boxes.
Analyst A7:
Risk management and control, which is probably 2, 3, 4 
pages worth of how they deal with and manage equity 
response, exchange risk, interest rate risk. [My criticisms 
are]: a) it doesn’t tend to change very much from year to 
year, [and] b), frankly most of this stuff is pretty common 
from bank to bank. Once you’ve read it once, you’ve 
probably read it as many times as you want to and it does 
very much tend to have this sense of being boiler-plating.
Analyst A17:
They just copy them from year to year so when they do 
the accounts they say ‘oh we have to put in this’ and they 
take last year’s and just put them, in which means we’ve 
already read them [in last year’s accounts].
Analyst A3 hinted that one reason for the poverty of 
disclosure was the complexity of the banking business.
If you want a decent discussion of risk management 
within banks you kind of need to be a banker already to 
understand it because they are inherently very 
complicated businesses.
There was, nevertheless, a general feeling that the 
presence of risk narrative was a potential source of 
comfort to analysts even though the content was probably 
not of direct material interest. Analyst A11 was typical in 
expressing the view: ‘I think it’s important to have it in 
because I think it makes banks think about those risks’. 
And similarly, Analyst A16 remarked that, ‘the fact that it’s 
there – you see it’s there, you know it’s there – it gives you 
some comfort that somebody has thought about it’.
When the question of reading the actual risk narrative 
reporting was raised, however, the general view was that 
analysts did not read it. Analyst A14 struck a sceptical 
note, saying, ‘I don’t think I’ve ever read much on 
operational risk but I certainly never remember reading 
anything useful in there.’ Analyst A4 described the content 
as being of ‘little use’ and Analyst A16, on being asked 
whether he or she ever read the risk reporting narrative, 
commented, ‘Probably not to be honest; probably not’.
A potential use of risk reporting was suggested by Analyst 
A4 in expressing frustration with dealing with investor 
relations (IR) people in some banks.
What I would like to see – and I’ve seen it absolutely 
nowhere – is you always have to drag these statements 
out of the IR people and its always like pulling teeth to 
get them to say something. Simple things like: do you 
hedge the following foreign exchange risk [example of 
foreign exchange risk given]?
Finally, only one analyst (Analyst A1) in the cohort of 19 
expressed something approximating to a positive view of 
the current state of risk reporting.
Interviewer: ‘Do you look at risk disclosure?’
Yes. The risk section is a key section in terms of country 
exposure, sector exposure and... trading risk as well. 
Those are all in there... and the risk management and 
control [and] operating risk [are items] that, yes, you’d 
look through.
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5.6 coRPoRAte goVeRNANce disclosuRe
Disclosure on corporate governance issues has been in the 
ascendant since the early 1990s when these issues first 
became of concern in the light of the Cadbury Report 
(1992) and since. The manner in which corporate 
governance content has been presented has become 
increasingly complex and organised in recent years as 
companies have sought to comply both with the range of 
(legally) voluntary codes and increased market 
expectations. Codes of practice in corporate governance 
have included those on executive remuneration, non-
executive directors, committee structures, internal control 
and reporting. In each case, the codes provide for the 
disclosure of information pertaining to that area in the 
annual report.
In the UK, corporate governance code compliance is 
voluntary in law but effectively mandatory under stock 
market listing rules (this being the nature of control in a 
principles-based jurisdiction). Although technically, 
companies can ‘comply or explain’, in practice large 
companies, and perhaps especially banks, normally 
comply to a high degree to maximise market confidence. 
One of the results of the increasing number of corporate 
governance codes since 1991 has been a substantial 
volumetric increase in corporate governance reporting. In 
contrast to some other sections of ‘front end’ reporting, 
corporate governance reporting is often numerical in part 
(reporting on executive salaries, for example) and its 
content is effectively prescribed by the various contents of 
the various codes of practice.
One reason why corporate governance in the banking 
sector has been a matter of historical concern to stock 
market participants was the collapse of a bank (the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International – BCCI) in 1991, 
which was one of the causes of increased regulation. 
Analyst A2 drew attention to this, saying: 
there have been banking disasters, [such as] BCCI, but I 
guess I’m starting [these days] with an implicit or 
assumed confidence [in banks’ corporate governance]. 
It might be misplaced but there have been one or two 
cases.
Analyst A12, similarly, opined, ‘I think corporate 
governance is an important issue. We’ve had scandals in 
the bank sector that proved it is important.’ This research 
was undertaken before concerns about Northern Rock 
emerged in the autumn of 2007.
The evidence from the cohort of analysts was that the 
increased corporate governance requirements including 
and since Cadbury had served to increase confidence in 
governance systems. Analyst A3’s confidence was signified 
by the comment, ‘corporate governance? Don’t care that 
much in the UK’. Analyst A6 said that, ‘it [corporate 
governance] doesn’t tend to be an issue in the UK’ and 
Analyst A12 stated bluntly, ‘I have confidence in the banks’ 
corporate governance structures’. Analyst A2 spoke for the 
majority saying, ‘I’m not aware of that many cases of major 
corporate governance problems with a bank’. When 
Analyst A13 was asked: ‘so you have full confidence in the 
corporate governance in UK banking?’ the reply was, ‘In so 
far as it’s important, yes’.
Several analysts brought out the confidence of corporate 
governance in UK-based banks. Because most of the 
cohort covered only these banks, they were not able to 
comment on corporate governance in other jurisdictions 
with lesser governance provisions. Analyst A6 said that:
because we cover UK and Irish banks and it’s certainly 
less relevant from our point of view. But yes, I think 
undeniably it obviously becomes important where 
corporate governance might be an issue [such as in 
some other jurisdictions].
With regard to reporting, the prevailing view was that while 
the presence of corporate governance content was 
important, it was of little materiality or use to the cohort of 
analysts. Analyst A7 said:
it’s of very limited interest to me to be absolutely honest. 
There’s very little here that I would actually tend to use… 
the statement of corporate governance is usually fairly 
low-value.
Analyst A6 was more laconic: ‘Do I use it? No. Do I think it 
is important for it to be there? yes’.
Others expressed blunter opinions, saying that they didn’t 
read the corporate governance content at all. Analyst A7 
said, ‘I don’t tend to look at that at all’. Analyst A12 gave 
more detail, saying: 
I do not read the corporate governance disclosures. I take 
the assumption that these companies are FTSE 100 
companies, they’re going to have pretty much the 
systems that they need and I’m happy to rely on that 
assumption.
Analyst A15 was in a minority, expressing the view that the 
statement of corporate governance was ‘useless’.
5.7 sociAl ANd eNViRoNmeNtAl (se) disclosuRe
While the subject of social, environmental and ethical 
reporting has increasingly been of interest to academic 
researchers, there has been relatively infrequent 
interrogation of user cohorts as to its usefulness and 
materiality. The evidence offered by the analysts in this 
study suggests a range of responses to this reporting 
category, but the prevailing belief is that both social and 
environmental matters are of limited interest to the 
professional analyst and forecaster. Probing the reasons 
for this lack of interest was one of the most intriguing 
parts of this research project. In organising the evidence in 
this disclosure category, content is set out in five 
subsections: 
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whether SE narrative is used and its materiality•	
evidence that some analysts may misunderstand the •	
nature of SE narrative 
environmental risk and disclosure•	
the potential (rather than the current) materiality of SE •	
reporting, and 
the way in which SE reporting is seen in the context of •	
the whole annual report.
use made, and materiality of, se narrative reporting
Analyst A2 put the issue in some kind of context, saying:
as I say banks, although they do have a part in the social 
fabric and so on… – the whole kind of stakeholder idea 
– for what I’m trying to do [social and environmental 
reporting is] not that relevant really. 
Analyst A15, as part of a commentary on his or her use of 
annual report contents said, ‘corporate social responsibility 
report? Even more useless [than the chairman’s statement 
and corporate governance].’ Analyst A17 said, ‘it sounds 
bad but from our point of view at the moment this CSR/
environmental [disclosure] is close to useless.’
Analyst A14 expressed this view: ‘Corporate and social 
responsibility report? Forget it. Just forget it’ after which 
the interviewer pressed, ‘Is CSR reporting totally useless to 
you?’ ‘yes!’
Upon probing in a little depth, it became apparent that 
social and environmental reporting was, for the cohort of 
analysts, perhaps the least read and least relevant part of 
the entire annual report. Analyst A1 was asked ‘Are you 
interested in social and environmental disclosure at all?’ 
which received the reply, ‘Not really, no.’ Analyst A2 said, 
‘Frankly I’d ignore it really’ and Analyst A4 said that 
‘Corporate and social [disclosure was] definitely no use.’ 
Analyst A7 reported that it was ‘absolutely useless from 
my point of view’.
Analyst A4 continued with a commentary. 
Business ethics [quoting from the narrative] blah blah 
blah. I’m not being funny but it just would never occur to 
me to look at that. There might be something incredibly 
useful in here but I would bet money that there isn’t! [So] 
corporate social [disclosure is] definitely no use. I’ve 
been a analyst now for eight years and it has come up in 
conversation exactly once during that time.
Analyst A1 confessed that:
I’ve never really looked at one [a social and 
environmental report] before so I could be just alone [in 
my view, but] we’ve got so many pressures on our time 
that it’s quite low in our list of priorities to actually read 
through that and if you’ve got to read the whole report 
that’s going to be the last [thing you would read].
Analyst A6 claimed to read the social and environmental 
report, ‘very, very rarely… actually I don’t think I’ve ever 
read through one’. Analyst A10 said of social and 
environmental reporting, ‘don’t give a damn. Personally I 
might give a damn. Professionally I don’t care.’ Analyst A11 
said, ‘very laudable but I’m not interested’, Analyst A13’s 
view was that ‘speaking purely from an investment analyst 
perspective it’s not useful at all’, and Analyst A12 said ‘I 
don’t read that part of the account.’ Similarly, Analyst A16 
said: ‘I can’t see any value in that section. I’ve probably 
never read one’.
Specifically with regard to environmental disclosure, 
Analyst A4 was as dismissive as he or she had been for the 
rest of the business ethics reporting (in the annual report 
being discussed): ‘Environmental blah blah blah. It’s a 
bank,’ implying that this identity had a bearing on its 
interest in environmental matters. Analyst A13 said that 
environmental narrative was ‘even less useful’ than the 
social and ethical components. Analyst A14’s view was: ‘I 
think… it’s a waste of money to be printing a lot of this, 
and also, I suppose there’s a kind of irony in printing an 
environmental report that nobody reads’.
With specific regard to social and environmental narrative 
and the question of materiality, the consensus view was 
that it was perhaps the least material (actual or potential) 
component of the annual report. There were, according to 
the cohort, a small number of situations in which it could 
be material to investment decisions but these were 
considered to be marginal: analysing for socially 
responsible funds or when a specific environmental risk 
applies. Analyst A6 reported that, ‘if the client’s funds 
aren’t socially responsible… then this sort of stuff is 
obviously somewhat less relevant to an extent from that 
[materiality] point of view’.
Analyst A5 was asked: ‘So in terms of your work as an 
analyst how you would judge the CSR component [of the 
annual report]?’
Not material at all. There might be analysts out there who 
sit and read this from cover to cover but is there anything 
in here material that’s going to affect the share price? No.
Analyst A9 highlighted a limitation of all narrative 
reporting, to analysts, with specific reference to social and 
environmental content, saying that, ‘These are more soft 
issues and they wouldn’t be driving the [forecasting] 
model. We are about numbers. We are putting numbers in 
a spreadsheet and coming up with a forecast.’ The 
implication of this comment is that unlike some other 
narratives, social and environmental reporting is unlikely to 
contain information capable of amending or informing any 
aspect of the financial forecasting model. In this respect, it 
seems there is a weak belief that any important 
environmental risks would be discussed in the social and 
environmental narrative.
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Analyst A12 expanded on this belief.
I know that there is an increasing demand in the market 
for ethical investment and those sorts of disclosures can 
help convince people of the ethics of investing in 
companies but we’re really interested in financial 
performance and valuation. I’m not convinced that at the 
moment those sorts of considerations [such as] CSR 
disclosures drive share prices.
Analyst A18 expressed a similar view.
I wouldn’t say they were completely useless but nothing 
from those sections go[es] into our models on how the 
companies work. We never write about that section at all.
misunderstanding of se reporting
A small amount of evidence emerged that analysts, in their 
unwillingness (in some cases) to read the social and 
environmental section of an annual report, may have 
misunderstood its content. Whereas in fact many reporting 
organisations, including banks, report on the 
environmental impact of their activities, some analysts 
appeared to judge social and environmental reporting on 
its most perfunctory content.
Analyst A4, for example, was dismissive, saying:
Looking at it, it’s just sort of ‘for customers who are deaf, 
hard of hearing or have speech impediments, a fully 
qualified sign language interpreter is available on 
request’.
Analyst A14 was seemingly unaware of the more detailed 
content of social and environmental reporting that has 
been introduced in recent years.
I don’t think that corporate social responsibility has any 
bearing on socially responsible investor issues because 
its all about how much paper – well I’m guessing because 
I haven’t read one – but I’m guessing its all about how 
much paper they’ve used and all this kind of stuff. Terribly 
irrelevant.
environmental disclosure and secondary environmental 
risk
One of the particular issues that the researchers wanted to 
explore with the cohort was the importance placed on a 
bank’s environmental exposure through its loan book 
rather than through its direct operations. For the purposes 
of clarity, direct environmental impact is defined as that 
applying to the actual operation of the organisation’s main 
direct operations. For a bank, this would be the 
environmental impact of its own employees in the normal 
pursuit of activities.
The point raised by Thompson and Cowton (2004), 
however, was that, uniquely, banks had a potentially large 
secondary or indirect environmental footprint in the 
activities that are facilitated or enabled through loans 
made. Analyst A3 was asked about the general 
environmental risks for a bank. The answer was typical of 
those failing to recognise indirect environmental risk.
Interviewer: you wouldn’t see environmental risk as part of 
the risk of the business at all?
Not really in a bank. Certainly if it was like a nuclear 
power station or an oil company I might worry about it a 
bit more.
Analyst A9 gave a blunt answer to the question of whether 
he or she would ever consider that banks might be 
complicit in pollution or expose themselves to 
environmental risks by their lending decisions, saying, ‘No. 
Straightforward answer. No.’
Analyst A3 explained that:
I think these guys are bankers not some sort of 
environmental guardians. That is probably something 
that’s far better controlled by other parties. I think it 
would be harsh of banks to try and work it [secondary 
environmental impact] out because when I think about 
investing in a bank I’m thinking about how it’s going to 
create money using my money.
Analyst A17 expressed similar misgivings, saying:
If banks by their lending can be held accountable for 
what the company does with the loan that would make it 
close to impossible for banks to do anything. The 
environmental impact, just doing the actual report they 
would have to use half an entire rain forest just to publish 
the report.
Analyst A18’s view was that it was not a bank’s purpose to 
moderate lending activity using environmental criteria.
I think to be honest that is the government’s job to 
regulate what industry does and I think ultimately the 
management of any company should try and maximise 
shareholder value.
Analyst A13 was asked whether he or she could ever 
envisage a situation where the environmental exposure 
from the loan book would ever be material to an analyst’s 
forecasts: ‘From my perspective, and certainly given the 
tasks I have, I can’t imagine it ever being material.’
Potential materiality of se disclosure
Given the responses from the cohort on the current 
relevance and materiality of social and environmental 
narratives, follow-up questions were asked on the 
situations that may increase their materiality in the future. 
The only situation at present where SE disclosure would be 
an annual report item worth analysing would be if it were 
for a socially or ethically filtered investment fund.
The size of the change needed was highlighted by Analyst 
A3, who was asked: ‘Could you ever see a situation where 
an environmental disclosure or a community disclosure 
would ever be material disclosure for you as an analyst?’
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Yes I could. It would purely be if it was driven by my 
clients – if we end up with a huge socially responsible 
investment community that dominates the landscape. At 
the moment the sort of people, like you and I, [who] 
invest in our pensions [want] to have a safe retirement, it 
may be nice to think about the environment a bit on the 
side, but I don’t like to inlay that decision into my pension 
pot.
Analyst A6 expressed a similar view:
I think yes, there are a few situations [where it could be 
potentially material]. One is the emergence of SRI 
[socially responsible investment] type funds and if they 
became – this isn’t our drive to, its not us saying you 
should be socially responsible or not – if the clients say 
that they want to run socially responsible funds then we 
would have to react to that. It’s their decision to make 
and if there was a big drive into socially responsible funds 
then it would become an increasingly important 
component of the accounts and what the banks are 
doing.
Analyst A12 expressed two viewpoints, beginning with the 
observation that, ‘Well the way things are going ethical 
investing is really taking off’. He or she continued, 
That’s a growing phenomenon so there are people in the 
market that are focusing on these things and if interest in 
those sorts of issues carries on growing at the rate that it 
has been then yes I can, in the future, conceive of a time 
when these sorts of things will be material. 
In concluding, however, Analyst A12 said, ‘but we’re 
actually a long way off from that now’.
Analyst A1 was asked if he or she could envisage SE 
disclosure becoming a material disclosure in the future: 
‘Only if you’re running that type of [SRI] fund. Otherwise 
no, not really.’
The interviewer proceeded to ask Analyst A1, ‘So it would 
need some kind of paradigmatic shift across the whole of 
the sector for you to be interested in that?’ Analyst A1 
replied: ‘yes I think so, yes. I’d be interested to see what 
other people say about that actually. I’m thinking maybe 
I’m alone.’
least material part of an annual report
Given the general scepticism of the value of the SE 
narrative in banks’ annual reports each analyst was invited 
to nominate a section that was the ‘least material’ to him 
or her in the conduct of their jobs as analysts. 
Analyst A1 spoke for the majority, saying, ‘for me as an 
analyst it would probably be the environmental report’. 
With a note of sarcasm, Analyst A11 said, ‘I’ll shock you by 
saying the corporate social responsibility report’.
Some analysts discussed a situation in which the SE 
content was not present in the annual report at all. Analyst 
A14 said: ‘ No I wouldn’t miss it. It would greatly facilitate 
my reading of the rest of it because it wouldn’t be in the 
way,’ and continued to note that it was a section that, 
‘nobody reads’. Analyst A16 said that: ‘It will sound awful 
but it wouldn’t affect me if you lost the whole corporate 
responsibility section really’.
5.8 ‘fRoNt eNd’ NARRAtiVe As PsychologicAl 
comfoRt
A number of interesting comments were made by analysts 
in response to an experiment conducted as a part of the 
interview process, involving the presentation of an annual 
report with the narrative front end removed from the 
document. Given that the prevailing view about most of the 
front end sections was sceptical in terms of value or 
materiality, the experiment was intended to test the 
response of analysts to the notional situation where all the 
developments in narrative reporting were reversed back to 
a ‘technical-only’ situation, where the document opened at 
the auditor’s report.
In terms of content that would be missed by analysts by 
this reversal, the most cited was the divisional or 
segmental data most frequently disclosed in the operating 
and financial review (OFR) (or section of similar name). 
Analyst A1 remarked that, ‘you’d miss the divisional... and 
I’d miss the financial review.’ Analyst A5 asked:
Where’s the divisional disclosure [in this notional 
document]? There is no divisional disclosure. Analysts 
have pushed incredibly hard over a number of years to 
get divisional disclosure and people have had to work 
hard to do it.
Analyst A7 referred to some of the technical content 
contained in the OFR:
Things like the additional levels of granularity they give 
you on things like how they calculate their interest 
margins, which happens to be one of the key assumptions 
that we use, in terms of trying to predict the future 
[would be lost in this notional document].
Analyst A11 said of the annual report without narrative 
content: 
I think I would have lost a significant amount. I would 
miss the OFR and [expressing a minority view] I would 
miss the chairman’s statement.
Opinions were divided over the extent to which, excepting 
some technical content in the OFR, the narrative content of 
the annual report would be a serious and material 
omission as far as the analysts were concerned.
Analyst A1 said that, ‘it wouldn’t particularly upset me [if 
the narrative content wasn’t there]’ but when later asked if 
it was a comforting pillow to have, answered, ‘yes.’ Analyst 
A6 remarked: ‘I’m comforted that it’s there, yes, definitely. 
But do I ever use it? Very, very rarely.’ 
26
A15 explained the potential effects of the omission of 
narrative content in a little more detail.
Yes, my point is that I think if the front end of the 
accounts weren’t there, despite having a lot of negative 
things to say about them, I think psychologically it would 
be a very striking omission in the sense that if there is 
something that you want to double-check, something that 
the chairman said or something that the directors are 
going on about, strategy or whatever it is, it’s almost a 
convenience to have it there for somebody to refer to. 
[So] I like to know that it is there, yes.
Analyst A16, similarly, expressed the view that despite the 
narrative content being of little direct materiality in terms 
of content, its presence in the annual report was a source 
of reassurance.
I think that would be an error of judgement to just take 
out [for example] the risk report even though analysts by 
and large aren’t going to read it. The fact that it’s there, 
you see it’s there, you know it’s there, gives you some 
comfort that somebody has thought about it. You look at 
the risk statement [for example]. You presume there’s 
nothing in there so you don’t read it. It doesn’t mean 
necessarily you’re not valuing it.
Most of those who expressed the view that the absence of 
front end narrative would be missed, explained that one of 
the major objections would be the omission of previously 
‘taken-for-granted’ content.
Analyst A2:
When somebody stops disclosing something, then your 
alarm bells ring automatically. So even if the thing on the 
face of it is not particularly relevant or you may discount 
it in the general run of things, if it disappears altogether 
then that would set alarm bells ringing.
Interviewer: ‘Why so?’
I think it’s slightly the cynical or questioning nature of an 
analyst that if something had been excluded then you 
must be hiding something. There must be some ulterior 
motive for excluding it and that generally has to be seen 
as a bad thing.
Interviewer: ‘Would it alarm you if the entire front end was 
missing?’
Yes… even where the statements themselves are quite 
bland.
Similarly, Analyst A17 remarked:
I think I would [miss it]. If it were not there then still 
you’d probably… say ‘hmm’. If it’s not there then you 
would think, ‘well what’s been going on?’ But yes if it 
wasn’t there then actually we would say, ‘wait a minute’.
Analyst A18 said:
[If the question is] Is there anything in the front section 
that I really need, [then] the answer is ‘no’. But I think 
you’ve still got a flavour of the company [from that 
content].
Against these views, however, was a substantial body of 
opinion that the narrative ‘front end’ would not be missed 
at all if removed completely.
Analyst A4 was asked, ‘would you be concerned if the 
whole front end was gone?’ and replied, ‘Not massively’. 
When asked whether he or she took any comfort from the 
narrative content being there, Analyst A4 replied, ‘No, I 
don’t really, actually’. Analyst A7 was similarly asked 
whether he or she would miss the front end, if the 
document opened at the income statement and balance 
sheet; the reply was, ‘From my point of view that would be 
absolutely fine.’ Analyst A10 said: ‘I wouldn’t miss it at all. 
So to my mind it is pure waffle.’ Analyst A14, when asked 
whether he or she drew any comfort from the front end, 
replied, ‘None whatsoever’. The interviewer asked whether 
Analyst A14 thought it would be acceptable if the annual 
report arrived without the front end. Analyst A14 replied, 
‘yes, absolutely’. Analyst A15 said he or she would 
‘certainly not’ have any problems with the whole front end 
being removed.
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Rather than seeking to provide a range of conclusions and 
policy recommendations, it is hoped that the evidence 
provided in this report will assist future researchers in 
identifying research opportunities and providing them with 
evidence to enrich existing research findings. In addition to 
this, however, a number of issues can be raised as a result 
of the evidence and these fall into the general areas of: 
issues for preparers•	
issues for change and analysts’ insight. •	
A final section offers suggestions for further research 
arising from the findings of this project.
6.1 issues foR PRePAReRs
It is curious, given the substantial growth in narrative 
content over the years, that little systematic evidence 
exists for the actual manner in which corporate reporting 
information is consumed. While part of the volumetric 
increase can be explained in terms of increased regulation 
and stock market listing requirements, it remains the case 
that the vast bulk of the increase is due to enhanced 
voluntary narrative. Although reporters have bulked out 
their annual reports with more and more content, little is 
known either about which audiences consume the 
respective parts of the annual report or the actual or 
potential investment materialities of those components.
This study has found, however, that at a fundamental level, 
the narrative contents of annual reports are relatively 
unimportant to analysts, who are one of the most 
important primary consumers of corporate reporting 
information. There was no consensus among the cohort 
that any given narrative content category was actually or 
even potentially material and, in most cases, the majority 
view was that each section was less than useful. Some 
sections of narrative reporting were seen by the analysts 
as being of almost no actual or potential materiality at all.
The most common reasons given by analysts for the 
assumed immateriality of the relevant disclosures were the 
lack of numerical content, lack of granularity (both of 
which affect the usability of the information in a financial 
forecast) or the assumption that their own clients (the 
buy-side) were not interested in information based on the 
type of voluntary narrative in question. The attitudes of the 
buy-side and their perceptions of sell-side information 
usefulness were not, however, tested in this research. 
These issues have been flagged as a suggestion for further 
research at the conclusion of this report.
So who is all this extra disclosure content actually for? 
Which audiences are conceived of when the content is 
being drafted? The content as presented appears, for the 
most part, to be inadequately detailed to feed into 
analysts’ forecasts although there is some evidence that 
the contents are used to verify information previously 
acquired. While some disclosure is insufficiently detailed, 
other parts are arguably too complex for non-sophisticated 
users. So it may be the case that some or maybe even 
most narrative falls ‘between two stools’ – insufficiently 
detailed, resolved or granulated for analysts and too 
complex for non-specialist individual investors.
Some narrative sections were especially poorly thought of 
by the cohort of analysts. There were very few positive 
views on the chairman’s statement, while the risk narrative 
was considered largely boiler-plating, and the social and 
environmental content was universally considered 
irrelevant. A challenge appears to exist for reporters to 
take their readers’ information needs into greater account 
when preparing and drafting annual reports.
6.2 issues foR chANge ANd ANAlysts’ iNsight
Evidence from this study suggests that analysts are very 
systems-driven and do not often think beyond the narrow 
confines of their roles in the capital market information 
‘supply chain’. It appears unlikely that they would be a 
source of pressure for change in terms of the social or 
environmental performance of businesses they cover as 
analysts.
They do, however, claim to be sensitive to the information 
needs of their own clients in the information supply chain. 
In this respect, it appears that pressure from the buy-side 
on such issues as environmental performance may cause 
a sell-side reappraisal of the materiality and value of social 
and particularly environmental reporting. It may therefore 
be that investor pressure on the buy-side for, say, filtration 
by environmental risk, performance or reporting will 
present pressure for change in the environmental 
awareness of analysts. There is a small amount of evidence 
for pressures of this type in the sell-side/buy-side 
relationship. The Enhanced Analytics Initiative, for 
example, is an international collaboration between asset 
owners and managers aimed at encouraging better 
investment research, in particular research that takes 
account of non-financial issues on long-term investment.
Internal change among the sell-side analysts themselves in 
this respect, however, is unlikely. The technocratic nature 
of the analysts’ skill set renders them less amenable to 
self-critique. The assumptions of capitalism pertaining to 
the supremacy of short-term growth and returns pervade 
the analysts’ operational activity.
There may be some grounds for questioning the structural 
appropriateness of the analysts’ skill set in interpreting 
narrative material for the purposes of financial planning, 
and in respect of the failure to recognise the potential 
materiality of secondary environmental risk. While the 
analysts were quick to dismiss narrative reporting as 
immaterial owing to its inability to be fed into a forecasting 
model, a case could be made that notwithstanding the 
perfunctory nature of much narrative reporting, it is the 
role of the analyst to interpret narrative content for the 
purposes of amending numerical forecasting. It is difficult 
to assess where the balance in this lies between the 
quality of reporting and the skill of the analyst, but the 
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dismissal of much narrative reporting by analysts may be 
a de facto admission of an inability to employ narrative 
content in financial models.
The unwillingness to recognise the possibility of secondary 
environmental risk may be symptomatic of the short-
termism of analysts’ financial forecasts. The possibility, at 
least, has to be admitted that analysts are demonstrating a 
fiduciary failure to include long-term risk analysis in their 
reporting, but as criticism of analysts as a cohort is not a 
purpose of this report this strand of enquiry will be taken 
no further.
6.3 issues foR fuRtheR ReseARch
This study has interrogated the user perceptions of annual 
reports of sell-side analysts, one of the most important (in 
share allocation terms) audiences of corporate reporting. 
Given that much of the narrative content of an annual 
report was considered irrelevant, inadequately resolved 
and worse (‘useless’ etc), research opportunities include 
the interrogation of other user perspectives and analysis of 
preparer perspectives, especially with regard to narrative 
reporting.
The cognitive and ‘organic’ processes involved in the 
selection of material for, and drafting and editing of, 
narrative voluntary disclosures remains under-researched. 
Given that an apparent discontinuity exists between 
preparers’ intentions and user perceptions, research 
opportunities clearly exist in exploring that. Additionally, if 
narrative reporting is of little overall use to analysts, 
research probing the consumption of content by other 
potential or actual users would be another worthwhile 
avenue to pursue. Little, for example, is known about the 
information consumption of small, private investors, 
non-professional investors and other stakeholders in a 
reporting company.
In summary, this report suggests a number of worthwhile 
avenues for further research arising from its findings.
Further work examining the processes occurring among •	
preparers of voluntary narrative information: in 
particular, it would be interesting to establish, with a 
large enough sample, the assumptions of materiality 
made by preparers with regard to the different 
categories of voluntary reporting.
An assessment of buy-side assumptions for the •	
purposes of establishing the extent to which the 
buy-side need for various information types is met by 
sell-side reports. In particular, changing attitudes to 
environmental issues among investors are, given the 
evidence presented in this report, unlikely to be 
important to the sell-side but may be more so to 
buy-side actors.
The attitudes of sell-side analysts to various voluntary •	
disclosure categories in other industrial sectors, 
especially the other high volume sectors of oil/gas, 
pharmaceuticals and technology, where risks and 
environmental exposures may differ. Similarities found 
between those and the bank analysts surveyed in this 
study would emphasise the potential need for change 
in those areas of voluntary disclosure and any 
differences could be highlighted for further discussion.
Studies investigating the manner in which specific •	
voluntary disclosure types are material to investment 
and to the potential attractiveness of the discloser as 
an investment. Omissions in material disclosures, 
perhaps concerning material risks, are one type of 
failure in this respect while obfuscations and lack of 
clarity are another.
A longitudinal study using either qualitative or •	
quantitative research methods to analyse analyst buy/
sell recommendations over time and the key factors 
attributable to changes in recommendations by 
individual analysts or an analyst group. 
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